(My underline in red is my answer to Carolyn Korsmeyer's text)
There is no obvious objective property
that can be correlated with all instances of aesthetic appreciation.
true, but that doesn't mean that we cannot discuss aesthetic norms based on objective properties and achieve best consensus. by the way, the same with the soft sciences, when it comes to economy, sociology or psychology, we don't find such certain objective properties either.
Nor do they
adequately account for the aesthetic enjoyment of nature or other objects that are not
works of art.
sure, aesthetics is an approximative normativation
While this essay concerns the concept of taste in western philosophical aesthetics,
this is not a culture-bound metaphor limited to philosophy grounded in Europe.
however there is a good chicken soup in India, one in China, one in Lebanon, one in Greece, one in Honduras, one in Haiti, one in Bahamas, i.e., and they all share chicken broth (which is better if it's slowly cooked)
‘Taste’ is a term literally employed to refer to one of the five senses, the one that
provides gustatory discrimination and enjoyment. As a bodily sense, taste is
inevitably linked with
pleasure
or
displeasure
; that is to say, it is a sensory response
that tends to carry a positive or negative valance. This affective component is one of
the features of gustatory taste that lends itself to employment as a metaphor of
aesthetic enjoyment, for the object of taste is not only perceived but also liked or
disliked.
One of the most salient features of the use of a sense metaphor for aesthetic appreciation is the requirement of first-hand experience. Discernment of aesthetic
properties of art or nature occurs only when one has direct experience of the object,
which arouses appreciative pleasure as a signal of the apprehension of aesthetic
quality. Just as one cannot decide that soup is well-seasoned without actually sipping
it, so one cannot conclude that music is lyrical and moving without hearing it.
Good point, which seems to illustrate that aesthetic norms are not capricious, they're rooted in empirical evidence.
The need to
educate taste is important, for the sense metaphor can too easily suggest that taste is
just a ‘natural’ ability. This error is perhaps promoted by the choice of this particular
sense as the root metaphor, because the bodily need to eat, which is abetted by the
sense of taste, would seem to be built into the human frame for survival purposes.
so what?
But aesthetic taste, however grounded in natural dispositions, clearly requires cultivation for all but the simplest beauties, and the same can be said for sophisticated
gustatory taste, as Voltaire points out. Situations that are likely to promote the cultivation of refined taste, such as leisure, education, and a degree of comfort, tinge the
notion of aesthetic discernment with a certain social privilege.
Cultivation doesn't mean elitism. It means having access to the information.
Taste can be a term
of manners as well, employed to describe the sensitivity required for polite social
interactions and appropriate behavior.
True, and manners are not -for the most part- capricious. They explain cultural adaptation to diverse environments, also known as RITUALS.
The use of the metaphor of taste weighed in on the side of interpreting aesthetic appreciation as a kind of sensibility,
although some theorists such as Edmund Burke insisted on the role of understanding
in determining appreciation. In any case, taste soon became the chief term employed
to explain the perception of beauty.
All you have to do is surmise that appreciating a painting is a form of tasting it visually.
The concept emphasizes the
subjectivity of experiences of beauty, understood as a particular type of pleasure, and
pleasure is necessarily located in a perceiving subject. But this is not the whole story,
for ‘judgements of taste’ also are about objects: the statement that a work of art is
beautiful is not just a report that it pleases the speaker, but a debatable claim that
refers to putative qualities of that object (such as harmony, balance, power,
profundity) that may be noticed and enjoyed by others.
we already discussed this last class. this is the difference between aesthetic fact and aesthetic opinion, for instance, "I dislike Guernica" is Ok. "Guernica is a mediocre painting" is false.
de gustibus, non est
disputandum: there is no disputing about taste.
agree, if you don't like it, you don't like it. DOESN'T THAT BEGS THE QUESTION? WHY DON'T YOU LIKE IT? THAT MORE INTERESTING!
Works of art are among the most scrutinized, assessed, criticized, and lauded
of human accomplishments.
Indeed.
Scottish empiricist David Hume makes central use of the idea that taste in art
is developed in ways rather similar to taste for food or drink. He regards the recognition of value qualities in objects to be a function of the pleasure and pain responses
of perceivers, and the similar constitution of all human beings furnishes the grounds
for agreement about matters of value. To function properly, the evaluative sentiments
must be in good working order. Just as a person with a bad cold is not in a position
to assess the qualities of a meal, so an inexperienced and naive person is not well
situated to judge the qualities of art. Hume advances his argument on behalf of
standards of taste with an anecdote about two tasters of wine who are ridiculed
because they can detect faint traces of metal and leather in a hogshead of wine that
no one else can taste. But they are vindicated in the end, because when the cask is
drained it is found to contain a key attached to a leather thong, and the discerning
tasters are proved to have the most delicate taste, “where the organs are so fine as
to allow nothing to escape them, and at the same time so exact as to perceive every
ingredient in the composition” (Hume 1898 [1757]: 273).
Hume unknowingly is advancing a realist position in aesthetics, THE FLAVOR OF LEATHER IS IN THE JUICE. Sommeliers do this all the time. remind me to talk about Triff's formula for wine tasting.
With practice and education, nearly everyone is capable of developing a degree of
delicacy of taste, for Hume is confident that the psychological and dispositional
constitutions of all people are as reliably similar as the morphological constancies
that govern normally functioning senses. And even those who fail at delicacy can
recognize the good taste of critics of finer discernment.
Wine tasting again!
Indeed, the ultimate standard
of taste in Hume’s mind must be the body of sophisticated judges, whose opinions
converge over time in agreement about the works of art that most repay attention
and deliver the highest degree of appreciation.
what I've called BEST CONSENSUS.
Kant, an appreciative critic of Hume, was wholly unsatisfied with the conclusion
that taste emerges as a general agreement among most good critics. He demanded a
stronger brand of universality for aesthetic judgements, which requires him to
emphasize the distinction between that which is merely pleasant (such as bodily
pleasure) and that which is beautiful (Kant 1987 [1790]: 55). The judgement of beauty indicates a brand of
pleasure that is not rooted in individual bodies replete with their idiosyncratic differences. It is grounded in the recognition of a harmony between the form of the
aesthetic object and the structures of rationality and understanding, which, being the
same in all rational creatures, demand a common recognition and qualify as
‘universal’ for all perceivers.
Ok, but even Kant can be modified a bit. The idyosincratic differences of the chicken soup are the ingredients (call it i) added to chicken stock, which is a constant, let's call it k*. Next we need the structure of rationality of the individual (call it R), and we have:
k* + i + Rchinese = k* + i + Rhaitian + k* + i + Ranglo... and so on
see what I'm doing, I'm suggesting that there are more constants than differences, namely k* and R itself (ingredient is, by definition, an add on, not an essence). the point Kant it making is that taste is real.
To account for his analysis of taste, Kant was particular
about the type of pleasure that qualifies as aesthetic: it is not sensuous or rooted in
the body, it is not a product of satisfied desire, it does not rely even on a preconceived
idea of what the object of enjoyment ought to be or what it is for. It is, in short, quite
‘disinterested.’ In his analysis of taste, Kant advanced the modern distinction
between
aesthetic
values and other kinds of values and objects of pleasure or satisfaction: moral, cognitive, instrumental.
Of course it has to be disinterested! You cannot taste well if you're hungry.
The metaphor of taste entered common parlance and became rather taken for
granted in aesthetic theory; but in the mid twentieth century it was injected with new
vigor and controversy by the arguments advanced by Frank Sibley in a series of
essays that invoke taste in an analysis of aesthetic qualities. Aesthetic objects are not
just works of art or objects that we happen to appreciate; they are objects that are
assessed and appreciated in virtue of certain qualities. But what kinds of qualities?
This question links the standard for taste with the ontological status of aesthetic
properties.
Sibley’s argument relies on a distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic
qualities (Sibley 1959).
Some qualities of art can be noticed by anyone with normally
functioning senses who is paying sufficient attention. For example, the fact that a
play contains four characters is a quality readily discernible to anyone who can see
or hear and count. This kind of quality is ‘non-aesthetic’; other examples of non-aesthetic qualities include square, loud, pale, sonnet, and in a minor key. But these
qualities are also value-neutral; they do not label the aesthetic attributes for which
one praises or rejects art or any other object. Aesthetic qualities are the properties
that distinguish an object as worthy of appreciation or criticism: delicate, elegant,
powerful, profound, stiff, awkward, and so on are examples of aesthetic qualities.
They are not easily discerned by all perceivers but rather require the exercise of a
certain sensitivity that Sibley, following tradition, labels ‘taste.’
Because there is more
variation in taste than there is in sense acuity, aesthetic judgements are more likely
to diverge than descriptions about non-aesthetic qualities. Even assuming that aesthetic qualities ultimately depend upon non-aesthetic
qualities, the former cannot be inferred from the presence of the latter.
So why is the best chicken stock that one simmered for hours?
That is, the
aesthetic property of being delicate depends upon the presence of non-aesthetic
properties such as thin or gently curving. If one praises a vase or bowl as delicate,
one might well point to those properties in explanation of the aesthetic predicate. At
the same time, the presence of the non-aesthetic properties does not guarantee the
aesthetic; they do not constitute sufficient conditions.
True, not sufficient, but necessary!
Some philosophers take a realist stance and argue that aesthetic
qualities are actual properties of objects. Perhaps they are ‘supervenient’ properties
dependent upon non-aesthetic properties, such that objects with the very same non-aesthetic properties must have the same aesthetic properties.
WELL SAID!
Taste may be considered
an ability to discern subtle qualities in objects: in food or drink the person with (fine)
taste can notice trace quantities of herbs or other flavors that lie beneath the
threshold of detectability for others. Someone with good artistic taste is more able to
discern the subtle points of style that distinguish a genuine painting of an old master
from a modern forgery; he or she is perhaps able immediately to tell Vivaldi from
Bach without looking at the disk label...
If you listen to a jazz phrase and you don't know music, or even jazz for that matter, your aesthetic understanding is lesser. I'm not prepared to say less intense, or less fitting (since you may be perceiving other COLORS that I, a jazz amateur miss. However the jazz amateur has an edge to her favor. I guss what I'm saying is that the experience is more COMPLETE.
To accuse a person of bad taste is a severe criticism that may invoke failings
aesthetic, moral, and social. Especially if one is at the receiving end of such a charge,
one may resentfully scoff at the position of the judge and the soundness of the criteria
used to distinguish good from bad taste.
We are judgmental animals. It's Ok. Just don't get offended. Always strive to explain your taste and you'll be fine.
The very popularity of certain types of art (some kinds of movies and music,
for example – sometimes called ‘mass’ art) may seem to be evidence for the absence
of aesthetic quality. This ironically splits actual aesthetic pleasure from the idea of
the best aesthetic taste.
Well, let's not be PC here. There are forms of rap, rock, pop, even jazz music that lack the richness of better samples of the form. And yes, generally mass produced is less
Suspicions leading in this direction have led some theorists to
the conclusion that the very idea of taste is more of a social than an aesthetic
category, that the elite of any society more or less impose their mandarin tastes on
the public, which dutifully acknowledges the superiority of the objects of elite
preference while pursuing their own more swinish and amusing tastes.
Never give up the facts and the bottom! A social category without facts contributing to it's a poor start, the reason being that it's dictated from above. Rather, social norms are caused by social facts which are caused by social interactions. Take manners. Good manners is a form of social cohesion. Societies engage in rules of etiquette because it works! It's a process from the bottom up, which is why there's a notable difference between protocols across cultures.
Perhaps the
most well-known of such approaches is represented by the French sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu (1979), who argues that aesthetic preferences are the product of class
distinctions rather than the recognition of standards of quality.
So be it, class distinctions are important. THEY EXIST FOR A REASON. This is not a cabal of courtesans deciding which manners they will employ. THEY ARE BORN INTO MANNERS! No one in particular designs that.
Bourdieu argues the converse: different eating habits, which divide
people by class and occupation, in fact represent the only manifestation of real taste.
The idea of aesthetic taste is social imposition in disguise.
Is the French Enlightenment a form of social imposition? What a silly hypothesis.
There are different kinds of aesthetic pleasure, some
of which are so taxing that the use of that particular term seems almost perverse.
Bernard Bosanquet (1915) distinguished ‘easy’ from ‘difficult’ beauty, and similarly
one may consider some pleasures more difficult to achieve than others, albeit more
rewarding in the long run. This is only a superficial paradox.
What is interesting about Bosanquet is that he believes beauty is more than what is aesthetically pleasing. And here comes the "easy part. He argues that while beauty is sometimes "easy," e.g., accessible to and recognizable by all—the excellence of certain beautiful items may be evident only to those possessing "aesthetic insight." And so, one may be fooled that X is ugly, when in fact one has not learned to appreciate it. It happens with food all the time. I'll share my experience with Thai shrimp paste of kapi. Kapi has a very strong odor. The same happens with the cheese vieux-boulogne ("old" boulogne is the translation so you get an idea). A discussion of the merits of vieux boulogne here. On the other hand, "ugliness" for Bosanquet, is really a failure in expression. Ugliness in art must not be confused with “difficult art”—i.e., art that is beautiful, though many may fail to appreciate it.
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