triff's notes on chapter 43 (Architecture)

Architecture is symbolic building. This follows Vitruvius three central themes: firmitas (strength), utilitas (functionality), and venustas (beauty).

Corbusier 5 points of Modern architecture (following his Villa Savoye)
1- pilotis,
2- replacement of supporting walls by a grid of reinforced concrete columns that bears the structural load is the basis of the new aesthetic.
3- free designing of the ground plan—the absence of supporting walls—means the house is unrestrained in its internal use (now the façade is free from structural constraints).
4- ribbon windows for illumination and ventilation,
5- roof gardens on a flat roof (providing aesthetic as well as essential protection to the concrete roof).

The representational theory: a building and its elements refer to the primitive building and its elements: a column represents a cut down tree, the capital represents a pad that sits the wooden beam atop it. A classical building refers to the elements of primitive building: to its primitive materials and to its methods of construction.

The semantic theory: this is, again, Goodman's theory. A building can denote its referent. Denotation is a simple relation and needs no further explanation. Example: The Sydney Opera House, we are told, denotes sailing boats.Understanding what the Sydney Opera House means is to apprehend the reference to sailing boats given by the building.

Sidney Opera, architect: Jorn Utzon, 1970s

A building can also exemplify the properties it represents. For example: the building refers to its means of construction. Take Dutch architect separates elements into beams,columns, frames and openings in order that the elemental ‘putting-together-of-the-building’ becomes exemplified.

 Rietveld's Schroeder House, 1924

 or this,

Rietveld's Chair, 1917

The experience counterargument:  One's connection to a building doesn't entail that one understands the representational content of the classical building. Our appreciation of a classical building can constitute an aesthetic appreciation that is clumsy, rudimentary, deep or subtle without any recognition of the ancient origins of its form.

Retort of the representational advocate: It only helps to wear representational glasses, since they make for a richer experience by informing the experience. One understands a building better if one is disposed to its historic context and the architect's intentions. 

If I understand the context of De Stijl movement, I'm better prepared to enjoy Rietveld's architecture.  
Functionalism in architecture: One strand of modernism arising from this background regards the function of a building as determining its form, so that the form of the building is aesthetically conceived as being appropriate to the utility for which the building was designed. According to this view, the beauty of a building is to be assessed in terms of its form in relation to its function. 

what is the function here?

 the white cube!

Austere functionalism: now function akin to that used in engineering. building is not an aesthetic theory at all, but an accidental bonus at best, entirely irrelevant or even "false consciousness" at worst. Hannes Meyer advocates this position. 

 Hannes Meyer's ADGB, 

and yet, one can make the case that Meyer's building do refer to a BAUHAUS aesthetic! 

Whatever the claims of the designers and their supportive theorists, the look of the works is aesthetically estimable and it seems incredible that this is mere caprice. Austere functionalism is a prime example of a critically engaged theory which immunizes its works from aesthetic criticism (by removing them from its orbit). 
 
Scruton's architectural theory: It has two part, Appreciation and judging.

1- Appreciation means we both enjoy works of architecture and feel that we can come to understand them. I do not merely perceive a building in front of me, but I can come to see the building in terms of a descriptive content which pulls together the various fragmentary perceptions I have when moving in and around it. This descriptive content, being aspectual, is based upon, but irreducible to, the material building at which I stare. That is to say that the experience, so described, is imaginative. Thus my experience of the building is subject to the will. It is a way of seeing the building for which I am responsible. (I cannot be wrong about how I see the building.)

2- Judging: I have a judgement about what I see. And I can argue with others to try and persuade them of its force. I feel I can organize the disconnected pieces of my perceptual world into a single continuous imaginative experience of a unified whole. This activity, in which I find myself engaged, is by its very nature judgemental, for it seeks this unity in the work conceived as imaginative, harmonious, agreeable and sensible.

notes on Nietzsche chapter 7

the will: a blind force which constantly strives for an unattainable resolution, to perpetuate further striving (see it as evolution's survival of the species).

the world: the realm of facts and pain (what existentialists called "absurd"). the multiple refraction of the world constitute the world of representation and experience.

dyonisian: the "primordial unity" of things, a state of "intoxication" in which the deepest and most "horrible truths" of the world are glimpsed.

apollonian: the illusory, "mere appearance" of things. a dream-like state in which all knowledge is knowledge of surfaces. aesthetically speaking, apollonian is the beautiful as intelligible.

the sublime: (in Kant's aesthetics) the overwhelming, awe-inspiring and yet elevating experience of things which exceed rational apprehension).

N's use of dynisian/apollonian: both Dionysian and Apollonian cross-fertilize one another, so that the metaphysical horror of existence is simultaneously revealed and made bearable (in aesthetics the prime example is TRAGEDY (especially Greek tragedy).

take the dilemma of Orestes written by Euripides: 1- he feels duty bound to avenge the murder of his father, Agamemnon, even though to do so will take killing his mother and becoming guilty of matricide. 2- the murder of Agamemnon by Orestes' mother, Clytaemestra, was committed to avenge the sacrifice of her daughter, Iphigeneia, by Agamemnon he rown dad! (but wait! the sacrifice of Iphigeneia had been demanded by the gods as atonement so that "fair Helen" could be retaken from Troy). 3- So, Orestes is caught up in a horrible web of obligation and necessity dictated by generation after generation of his ancestors wreaking violent revenge on each other. Each act requires to respond to an earlier one, but none able to claim any ultimate moral justification.

Nietzsche (part 2)

in N2 the appearance/reality distinction is transposed into the real world of human experience. 

art lies: "art is the lie that sanctifies and the will-to-deception then has a good conscience". art beautifies life by interposing a veil of lies between us and truths about the world that we cannot bear (note: Wilde said the same thing contemporaneously in his The Decay of Lying).

life-affirming valuations: it's the acknowledgement of the instincts of the SELF: they make our spirit soar, we become proud of ourselves.  

life-denying valuations: we fall prey to weakness, to bad faith, do double morality.

master morality: master morality is nobility, qualities of open-mindedness, courage, truthfulness, trust, and an accurate sense of one's self-worth. the master is rooted in self-affirmation & self-glorification of life.

slave morality: the inverse of master morality, based on resentiment. self-denying, pessimistic, cynical, subservient to norms, slave morality devalues what the master values and the slave does not have.

art and the artist: art is a transformative and interpretative activity. art includes all creation and imposition of forms. the artist finds and creates new meaning.

morality as a constraint: every morality involves the regulation of behavior through the repression of (at least some) instincts.

morality is a special case of the aesthetic. morality constraints, art liberates

Self-poesis: one is and becomes one's work of art. to achieve self-poesis one has to be ruthless with oneself, both in recognizing ones own bad faith (the different ways that we lie to ourselves) and fixing it by reinterpreting it.

christian/pagan dichotomy: the christian construes himself as an immortal soul, while the pagan understands all suffering in relation to the spectator of it. the pagan sees life as a movie he has to play.

amor fati: love your fate.

animals & rights (triff's notes)

speciecism: the view that moral rights are extended only to human animals.

human exceptionalism: humans have uniquely distinct capacities and it is on the basis of these capacities that humans have moral status over other animals.

person properties: reason, free will, sentience, autonomy. most animals lack the human level of reason and free will. though a dolphin, a gorilla and an elephant can be considered quasi-persons, dogs are getting more attention now (but a dog doesn't have the brain of a dolphin or a primate).*

animals however have sentience. 

legal persons: animals don't respond for themselves.

animal rights' problems:

1- the problem with animal rights is that they can't defend these (a right to life would be paramount. if so, we can't eat them).

2- the scalar** problem: do we extend rights to all animals? it would be impossible. imagine killing insects that attack food, or livestock. just mammals? if so, why not fish, birds, insects? some have suggested "danger of extinction" as a scalar.

in the end humans would have to invoke exceptionalism. 

animal welfare: it's the concern for the treatment of food animals, both during their lives and when they are slaughtered. animals should be pre-stunned prior to slaughter (there are exemptions for religious groups to provide kosher (or shechita) and halal meat.

_________________
*primates have a degree of the following: episodic memory, self-consciousness, self-knowing, self agency, referential and intentional communication, mental time-travel, numerosity, sequential learning, meditational learning, mental state modeling, visual perspective taking, understanding the experiences of others, intentional action, planning, imagination, empathy, metacognition, working memory, decision-making, imitation, deferred imitation, emulation, innovation, material, social, and symbolic culture, cross-modal perception, tool-use, tool-making, cause-and-effect.

** We can think of interests as scalar; crucial interests are weightier than important interests, important interests are weightier than replaceable interests, and all are weightier than trivial interests or mere whims. When there is a conflict of interests, crucial interests will always override important interests, important interests will always override replaceable interests, etc. So if an animal has an interest in not suffering, which is arguably a crucial interest, or at least an important one, and a person has an interest in eating that animal when there are other things to eat, meaning that interest is replaceable, then the animal has the stronger interest and it would be wrong to violate that interest by killing the animal for food if there is another source of food available.

the 3 moments in the aesthetics of Nietzsche

let's start with Nietzsche idea of Will (der Wille): a blind force which constantly strives for an unattainable resolution, and so serves merely to perpetuate further meaningless striving.

contrast the will to the world (der Welt). the world is therefore the pain of irreparable lack (what existentialists called "absurd"). the multiple refraction of the world constitute the world of representation and experience.

Next, N contraposes the "Dionysian" and the "Apollonian" principles. Here we get an idea of his aesthetics. the Dionysian is the "primordial unity" of things, a state of "intoxication" in which the deepest and most "horrible truths" of the world are glimpsed.

(side note Kant had called something similar "sublime", i.e.,  he overwhelming, awe-inspiring and yet elevating experience of things which exceed rational apprehension).

opposed to the Dionysian we get the Apollonian, which stands for the illusory, "mere appearance" of things. Apollonian indicates a dream-like state in which all knowledge is knowledge of surfaces. Aesthetically speaking, the Apollonian is the beautiful as intelligible, as conforming to the capacities of the representing intellect.

N's claim is that both Dionysian and Apollonian principles cross-fertilize one another, so that the metaphysical horror of existence is simultaneously revealed and made bearable. The ravages of intoxication are transfigured by dreams, and the sublime is beautified by the veil of appearances. Tragedy (especially Greek tragedy) reconciles both existence and the world.

Nietzsche (part 2)

In Twilight of the Idols N writes: "if we abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps?. . . But no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!".

now the appearance/reality distinction falls squarely within the ordinary, everyday world of actual experience.

so, in N2 the appearance/reality distinction is transposed into the real world of human experience. 

this he calls human too human struggling between lies and truth.

the lie that performs the task of making life bearable. "art is the lie that sanctifies and the will-to-deception then has a good conscience". art beautifies life by interposing a veil of lies between us and truths about the world that we cannot bear (note: Wilde said the same thing contemporaneously in his The Decay of Lying).

for N2 art-as-lie is structurally identical to the Apollonian... in a famous unpublished note of 1888, he writes: "we possess art lest we perish of the truth."

What does all art do? does it not praise? does it not glorify? does it not select? does it not highlight? By doing all this it strengthens or weakens certain valuations. . . Is this no more than an incidental? an accident?Something in which the instinct of the artist has no part whatever? Or isit not rather the prerequisite for the artist’s being an artist at all . . . Is this basic instinct directed towards art, or is it not rather directed towards the meaning of art, which is life?

N2 uses an arsenal of metaphors to make this point: life-affirming valuations and life-denying valuations, superabundance and hunger, ascending life and declining life, strength and weakness, health and sickness.

N2 groups moralities under two heads: "noble morality," is rooted in a triumphant Yes". it's self-affirmation, self-glorification of life." on the other hand we have "slave morality," which from the "outset says No."

now art not morality, is the most fundamental symptom of a psychological economy. why art?

*art comprises "all creation and imposition of forms." the artist is the one that finds new meaning in relation to the whole. art includes every transformative, interpretative activity. its moral domain is "narrower" than the aesthetic. so, morality is simply a special case of the aesthetic.

*morality is a constraint: every morality involves the regulation of behavior through the repression of (at least some) instincts (Freud later uses this as his überich or superego).

At the lower limit, N2 places the noble moralities of human prehistory, in these man/animals we find the smallest degree of repression consistent with self-consciousness.

Art, liberates all these (repressed) forces.

Nietzsche part 3

N3! explores the idea of self-poesis or self-stylization = you're your own work of art. 

to achieve self-poesis one has to be ruthless with oneself, both in recognizing one’s own bad faith (the different ways that we lie to ourselves) and fixing it by reinterpreting it.

N3's motto is truth is ugly but art comes to the rescue.

self-poesis avoids complacency. we need to interpret ourselves, but interpretation is BIASED. we lie to ourselves perpetuating stagnation. uninterpreted life is worse: we remain ignorant. so, the challenge, is to interpret suffering correctly. now N3 explains the difference between christian and pagan self-poesis.

the christian construes himself as an immortal soul while the pagan understands all suffering in relation to the spectator of it. the pagan sees life as a movie he has to play. this is N3's idea of AMOR FATI ("love your fate"). this is close to triff's REALITY IS PERFECT mantra.

so, the christian's version of life is a form of poverty of life. the pagan, by contrast has a nobler approach because it looks at life in the face. why? because suffering is LIFE AFFIRMING. a symptom of abundance.

triff's notes on rights

what is a right? a right is a normative rule about what is owed of people or allowed of people.

rights express a certain relationship between two parties, the rights holders and the rights observers. Rights have two faces, depending on whether they are viewed from the perspective of the person who has the right or from the POV of the person who ought to respect the right.

what's an entitlement: a permission to act from the standpoint of the rights holder (it imposes a duty on others to oblige).

natural rights: are "natural" in the sense of "not man-made", one owns them because one belongs in the HOMO SAPIENS club. therefore, they are universal. they apply to all people, and do not depend from the laws of any specific society. they are inherent.

absolute right: an absolute right is the strongest right, which cannot be overridden by any other types of considerations (e.g., utility or expedience) that do not involve rights. example, right to freedom. imagine the right of a city to impose levies on my property for the construction of a project that benefits a section of the town my property is not on. in this case my right to freedom overrules the rights of the town to demand my acquiescence.  

prima facie rights: it means that at first sight, the right appears applicable but upon closer scrutiny, we may decide that other considerations outweigh it. 

legal rights: these are based on a society's customs, laws, statutes or actions by legislatures the right to vote (a felon may not enjoy that right).

negative rights: these are permissions not to do things, or entitlements to be left alone. another way of looking at it is that negative rights are natural. Lockean proviso of rights: right to freedom, private property and pursuit of happiness.

positive right: is an entitlement ("one is entitled to") a specific service or treatment from others, and these rights have been called positive rights. example: welfare rights. see that positive rights are rights one consents in others having. one is not "born with them".

once again: a difference between negative and positive rights is that a negative right forbids others from acting against the right holder, while a positive right obligates others to act with respect to the right holder. If you think of the Kantian categorical imperative, a negative right can be associated with perfect duties (one is obligated to perform them) while positive rights are connected to imperfect duties (one is not obligated to perform them).  

political rights: they protect individuals' freedoms from infringement by governments, social organizations, and other private individuals. they include peoples' physical and mental integrity, life, and safety. they include: protection from discrimination on grounds such as race, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, color, age, political affiliation, ethnicity, religion, and disability. they also include negative rights such as freedom of thought, speech, religion, press, assembly, and movement. 

from the previous definition of political rights, one infers the rights to equal opportunity.

right to equal opportunity: is a state of fairness in society (in education or employment or housing) where people are treated similarly, unhampered by artificial barriers or prejudices or preferences, except when particular distinctions can be explicitly justified.

example: take a person applying for a job. 1- her chances should be based solely on her qualifications. she should not be discriminated against because of position, connections, religion, sex, ethnicity,  race, age, gender identity, or sexual orientation.

making a distinction based on anything other than her qualifications would amount to denying others of equal opportunity.

homework chapter 43, architecture

1. what is the representational theory of architecture, pros and cons.
2. what is the semantic theory, pros and cons.
3. what is content and the aesthetics of architecture?
4. what is the difference between aesthetic and austere functionalism?
5. what's Scruton's account regarding the difference between experiencing and judging architecture?