Sunday, February 28, 2016
homework chapter 3
1. what do we call a religion?
2. mention the main features of a religion.
3. what did religions provide early societies with?
4. did religions spur civilizations? how?
5. what is fideism?
6. define the conflict model, the compatibilist and the incompatibilist model,
7. what's the divine command theory?
8. can religion be liberating? (think of the civil rights movement in the 1960s)
faith vs. reason
the basic problem of faith and reason in religion comes from the tension between the spiritual realm and the physical realm.
the spiritual realm involves supernatural facts, ecstasy, divine revelation, sacred pronouncements, which are immune from rational critique and evaluation. see that the spiritual realm consistently appears in all cultures.
i said in class that fighting the spiritual realm with rational arguments is a category mistake.
that doesn't mean that we should avoid rational examination of our beliefs. the key philosophical issue regarding the problem of faith and reason is to work out how the authority of faith and the authority of reason. here are some ways to cut the cake:
fideism: faith is a kind of super-belief that doesn't need physical proof. st. paul has a great definition: "... faith is the assurance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen." given this definition, the fideist doesn't need physical evidence.
there are three approaches:
1. conflict model: faith and reason are incompatible because they claim different things.
2. incompatibilist model: faith and reason are different. reason aims at empirical truth; faith deals with spiritual truths. so, there's no rivalry.
3. compatibilist model: faith and reason have a connection. compatibilism entertains a rational explanation for the existence of god, such as st. anselm's ontological argument, or thomas aquinas's prime mover, etc.
the spiritual realm involves supernatural facts, ecstasy, divine revelation, sacred pronouncements, which are immune from rational critique and evaluation. see that the spiritual realm consistently appears in all cultures.
i said in class that fighting the spiritual realm with rational arguments is a category mistake.
that doesn't mean that we should avoid rational examination of our beliefs. the key philosophical issue regarding the problem of faith and reason is to work out how the authority of faith and the authority of reason. here are some ways to cut the cake:
fideism: faith is a kind of super-belief that doesn't need physical proof. st. paul has a great definition: "... faith is the assurance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen." given this definition, the fideist doesn't need physical evidence.
there are three approaches:
1. conflict model: faith and reason are incompatible because they claim different things.
2. incompatibilist model: faith and reason are different. reason aims at empirical truth; faith deals with spiritual truths. so, there's no rivalry.
3. compatibilist model: faith and reason have a connection. compatibilism entertains a rational explanation for the existence of god, such as st. anselm's ontological argument, or thomas aquinas's prime mover, etc.
anthropological/evolutionary argument for religion
intro
1. Religion today is a common denominator in world politics (Islam, Christianity, Hinduism) which is why it is all the more important to understand it correctly.
2. People confuse religion with the easy stereotype of ignorant people that believe the world was created in seven days and Adam and Eve. In other words, they confuse the whole of religion with "religious narratives."
3. A misconception is to blame religion for the ills of the world. A silly as blaming the world itself for world history. It's US HUMANS who benefit from religion, otherwise it would not exist.
4. Another misconception is that religion is "oppressive," but what is exactly oppressive about? If religion is a cultural product, then it has to come with all the goods and evils of culture.
click here for theories of religion,
we need to understand why religions perdure after 150,000 years of human existence and still provide important social cohesion.
present facts:
there are 2.2 billion christians (32% of the world’s population), 1.6 billion muslims (23%), 1 billion Hindus (15%), 500 million buddhists (7%), 14 million jews and an estimated 58 million practicing others faiths like, jainism, sikhism, taoism, etc,
1. religions are cultural systems of beliefs behaviors and practices: they include moral rules, holy narratives, holy texts, holy places, holy martyrs, all of which relate to supernatural, transcendental and spiritual beliefs and practices, worldviews, prophecies, codified morals and devout human groups dealing with godly, the supernatural, the transcendental, the spiritual REALM.
religions exhibit the following:
a) cosmology, the PAST (creation of the universe), the NOW and the FUTURE (teleology),
b) rituals include worship, commemorations, sacrifices, festivals, feasts, trances, initiations, funerary services, matrimonial services, meditation, prayer, worship, holy music, holy art, devout public service, etc.
c) canonic texts, (bible, koran, upanishads, baghavad gita, etc)
d) prophets (Christ, Buddha, Mohamed, Confucius, Zarathustra),
2. religions provide viable symbols, which explain the origin and the meaning of life, the universe, human finitude, and our purpose on this earth,
what would we be without the richness of our cultures' symbols?
evolution
3. religions' origins hark back to paleolithic and neolithic rituals with the dead (keep in mind that non-human animals display only a casual interest in the dead).
why did homo sapiens developed specific behaviors toward the dead? for sure not out of a mushroom induced orgiastic ritual.
why do we as humans need the afterlife? because human life is not enough to explain the finitude of human life.
4. quite early, homo sapiens develop specific religious symbols across cultures. how? homo sapiens anchored supernatural entities through representational art and rituals. once they are translated into material form, supernatural concepts become easier to communicate and understand.
moral precepts are simply explained, what's right is right because God commands it!
this is a didactic feat of social and moral evolution! the simplicity and effectiveness of religions absorbing moral behaviors cannot be underestimated from the anthropological standpoint.
5. then about 10,000 years ago, religion becomes a civilizing engine, by establishing theocracies with defined priesthood classes, along with kings and emperors.
virtually all state societies from around the world have founded political power through divine authority. in spite of all the noise, secularism cannot properly succeed without a amicable relationship with religion (the quintessential example is the forced secularization of the soviet union under communism in the 20th century. it didn't work).
Tuesday, February 23, 2016
exam #2 (chapters 27, 29, 30)
criticism (chapter 27)
legislative criticism: treats artistic AW as something up for refined discrimination and a self-conscious education in taste. Basically it tells you what, it speaks with conviction and assuredness.
There is a difference between critique and review. in the second you make descriptive comments about it and withhold evaluation. in the first you evaluate.
appreciative description: In appreciative description the critic functions as an intermediary between the work and the audience. The critic is presumed to have better taste, greater sensitivity to meaning, and more extensive relevant knowledge than the audience. The critic simultaneously evaluates and describes.
analytic criticism: you take the work and basically deconstruct it. you need to be informed of the latest theories. the advantage is analysis, the disadvantage is it tends to disconnect with readers.
interpretive criticism: The interpretive criticism that produces significance is usually directed to canonical works, and it serves a function similar to that of the re-staging of dramatic works.
cultural criticism: This notion of criticism comes from Karl Marx and Matthew Arnold. The idea is to put the AW's ideas into a cultural or socio-political context.
art & expression (chapter 30)
classical expression theory: Art is an expressive human activity (bu means of signs, feelings, experiences). For example, the artist expresses "sadness" to the audience by causing the work to possess or express sadness.
semantic theory: (defended by Nelson Goodman). It attempts to explain the central features of art within a theory of symbols. A expresses E, according to Goodman, if
1. A possesses E metaphorically, and
2. if A exemplifies E.
Example: If Guernica expresses horror, then the painting must express horror metaphorically by exemplifying it.
flavor vs. emotion: it's based on evoltution. there are 1. primary reinforcers: pheromones, (odors such as ripe fruit, and the smell of rotting food). 2. inter-species odors: odors of individuals may be pleasant because of major histo-compatibility complex genes, (e.g. same tribe, cultural region, etc). people smell like the foods they use. which specify olfactory receptors that signal reward produced be the smell of another individual with different immune system.
examples: a) homo S detecting individuals with a different immune system may have more diverse immune systems, and thereby greater resistance to disease. b) the odor of the cheese brie may be initially unpleasant, but may become pleasant after learned association with its taste and fatty texture (fatty texture is a primary reinforcer because of a high-energy value food).
art and morals (chapter 29)
aestheticism (autonomism): holds that ethical assessment is irrelevant to aesthetic assessment.
An extreme version of autonomism is that it makes no sense morally to evaluate works of art, in the same way that it makes no sense for instance morally to evaluate numbers.
wholistic autonomism: moral aspects in the work -though relevant- don't need to conflict with its aesthetic role. I can say that "Hitler is wonderfully portrayed," or "the rape scene in Irréversible is very compelling," precisely because its depiction of human depravity. the autonomist is ready to admit (sith the moralist) that literary works of authors like Dostoevsky and Shakespeare, convey important moral insights.
immoralism: holds that works of art may be aesthetically good because of their ethical flaws. Although ethics and aesthetics are normative disciplines, they very different in scope. aesthetics evaluates beautiful non-beautiful, ethics evaluates right, wrong, Extreme immoralism: holds that the only aesthetic merits of a work of art are its ethical flaws. If so, Marquis de Sade one of the greatest writers of all time, and George Eliot one of the worst. Extreme immoralism is clearly weak.
moralism (or ethicism): in contrast holds that works of art are aesthetically bad because of their ethical flaws.
Jokes as a genre are at best analogous to works of art. Here the immoralist and the autonomist could agree but for different reasons: The autonomist would maintain that jokes are not in the moral sphere. It's an AS IF... without having to say that it's aesthetically good, precisely because it offends, which seems bizarre. on the other hand one has to agree that in the particular case of comedy (and humor in general) is an aesthetically relevant feature because it is offensive. the immoralist would say the more offensive, the better.
here comes the cognitive ethicist argument: works of art teach us moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. To make this cognitivist argument work it is not enough to show that art can educate us morally. One also has to show that its capacity to teach us is an aesthetic merit in it.
legislative criticism: treats artistic AW as something up for refined discrimination and a self-conscious education in taste. Basically it tells you what, it speaks with conviction and assuredness.
There is a difference between critique and review. in the second you make descriptive comments about it and withhold evaluation. in the first you evaluate.
appreciative description: In appreciative description the critic functions as an intermediary between the work and the audience. The critic is presumed to have better taste, greater sensitivity to meaning, and more extensive relevant knowledge than the audience. The critic simultaneously evaluates and describes.
analytic criticism: you take the work and basically deconstruct it. you need to be informed of the latest theories. the advantage is analysis, the disadvantage is it tends to disconnect with readers.
interpretive criticism: The interpretive criticism that produces significance is usually directed to canonical works, and it serves a function similar to that of the re-staging of dramatic works.
cultural criticism: This notion of criticism comes from Karl Marx and Matthew Arnold. The idea is to put the AW's ideas into a cultural or socio-political context.
art & expression (chapter 30)
classical expression theory: Art is an expressive human activity (bu means of signs, feelings, experiences). For example, the artist expresses "sadness" to the audience by causing the work to possess or express sadness.
semantic theory: (defended by Nelson Goodman). It attempts to explain the central features of art within a theory of symbols. A expresses E, according to Goodman, if
1. A possesses E metaphorically, and
2. if A exemplifies E.
Example: If Guernica expresses horror, then the painting must express horror metaphorically by exemplifying it.
flavor vs. emotion: it's based on evoltution. there are 1. primary reinforcers: pheromones, (odors such as ripe fruit, and the smell of rotting food). 2. inter-species odors: odors of individuals may be pleasant because of major histo-compatibility complex genes, (e.g. same tribe, cultural region, etc). people smell like the foods they use. which specify olfactory receptors that signal reward produced be the smell of another individual with different immune system.
examples: a) homo S detecting individuals with a different immune system may have more diverse immune systems, and thereby greater resistance to disease. b) the odor of the cheese brie may be initially unpleasant, but may become pleasant after learned association with its taste and fatty texture (fatty texture is a primary reinforcer because of a high-energy value food).
art and morals (chapter 29)
aestheticism (autonomism): holds that ethical assessment is irrelevant to aesthetic assessment.
An extreme version of autonomism is that it makes no sense morally to evaluate works of art, in the same way that it makes no sense for instance morally to evaluate numbers.
wholistic autonomism: moral aspects in the work -though relevant- don't need to conflict with its aesthetic role. I can say that "Hitler is wonderfully portrayed," or "the rape scene in Irréversible is very compelling," precisely because its depiction of human depravity. the autonomist is ready to admit (sith the moralist) that literary works of authors like Dostoevsky and Shakespeare, convey important moral insights.
immoralism: holds that works of art may be aesthetically good because of their ethical flaws. Although ethics and aesthetics are normative disciplines, they very different in scope. aesthetics evaluates beautiful non-beautiful, ethics evaluates right, wrong, Extreme immoralism: holds that the only aesthetic merits of a work of art are its ethical flaws. If so, Marquis de Sade one of the greatest writers of all time, and George Eliot one of the worst. Extreme immoralism is clearly weak.
moralism (or ethicism): in contrast holds that works of art are aesthetically bad because of their ethical flaws.
Jokes as a genre are at best analogous to works of art. Here the immoralist and the autonomist could agree but for different reasons: The autonomist would maintain that jokes are not in the moral sphere. It's an AS IF... without having to say that it's aesthetically good, precisely because it offends, which seems bizarre. on the other hand one has to agree that in the particular case of comedy (and humor in general) is an aesthetically relevant feature because it is offensive. the immoralist would say the more offensive, the better.
here comes the cognitive ethicist argument: works of art teach us moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. To make this cognitivist argument work it is not enough to show that art can educate us morally. One also has to show that its capacity to teach us is an aesthetic merit in it.
Monday, February 22, 2016
ART AND ETHICS, reading chapter 29
Intro
The relation of art to ethics has been at the forefront of several recent controversies about art.
The relation of art to ethics has been at the forefront of several recent controversies about art.
Consider the following:
1. the protests over the sexism and violence seemingly advocated in the music of ‘gangsta’ rappers such as Ice-T;
2. the controversy over the violence of many Hollywood movies, such as Natural Born Killers;
3. the fatwa declared against Salman Rushdie for publishing The Satanic Verses.
Art has the power to disturb, power to pummel against the bulwarks of our ethical convictions.
are the ethical flaws (or merits) of works of art also aesthetic flaws (or merits) in them?
Consider Leni Riefenstahl’s famous film, Triumph of the Will, which is a glowingly enthusiastic account of the 1934 Nuremberg Nazi Party rally. Is the film aesthetically flawed because of its advocacy of Hitler’s cause? It has frequently been denounced as bad art because of its message. Or is its immoral stance simply an irrelevance to its merit as a work of art? So we have three positions:
_________
Aestheticism (autonomism) holds that ethical assessment is irrelevant to aesthetic assessment.
_________
Aestheticism (autonomism) holds that ethical assessment is irrelevant to aesthetic assessment.
Immoralism holds that works of art may be aesthetically good because of their ethical flaws.
Moralism (or ethicism) in contrast holds that works of art are aesthetically bad because of their ethical flaws.
Autonomists acknowledge that although ethics and aesthetics are normative disciplines, they are very different in scope. Aesthetics evaluates beautiful non-beautiful, ethics evaluates right, wrong,
Aesthetic works -unlike moral actions- are not "actions" of fundamental consequence for human welfare, (this is granting that artworks could be considered actions).
Autonomists acknowledge that although ethics and aesthetics are normative disciplines, they are very different in scope. Aesthetics evaluates beautiful non-beautiful, ethics evaluates right, wrong,
Aesthetic works -unlike moral actions- are not "actions" of fundamental consequence for human welfare, (this is granting that artworks could be considered actions).
How about an art performance. It looks like an "action," but it's a pretending one... the action is not real, moral actions, on the other hand, should be considered real actions.
First, some works of art are ethically deeply flawed, for instance Triumph of the Will, yet they are good, or even great, works of art. That being so, it might be argued that the ethical cannot be aesthetically relevant. Now, the example certainly proves something: if one held that moral merits are the only kind of aesthetic merits which there are, then one must aesthetically condemn the film.
Gaut takes a different approach, for her the aesthetic attitude is defined in terms of detachment or disengagement from practical concerns, being an attitude of pure contemplation towards the aesthetic object (the idea derives from the Kantian notion of disinterest).
ok, this is partly true. though it's not a requirement that the aesthetic is divorced from emotions -as we have learned with my previous lecture on the flavor emotion connection.
However, even if one accepted this disputable characterization, it would not follow that moral considerations played no role in aesthetic assessment. I am forced to take a merely contemplative attitude towards historical figures such as Napoleon, since I can do nothing to alter the past, I could still hold moral views about these individuals.
sure, why not. look at this two propositions: 1. "Hitler was a good watercolorist." 2. "Hitler was a mass murderer." 1. and 2. are independent. Let's add one more: 3. "Hitler loved dogs," which is true. 1. 2. and 3. are independent. they address Hitler "notes". not all of Hitler notes are moral notes.
Our aesthetic interest is directed not just at lines and colors, but also at how the art work presents a certain subject-matter:the ideas and attitudes it manifests towards its subject. Consider Picasso’s great antiwar painting Guernica. Someone who reacted to it merely as a set of line sand colors in Cubist style would be missing out on a central item of aesthetic interest: namely, how Picasso uses Cubist fragmentation to convey something of the horror of war and Fascism. Our aesthetic interest is directed, in part, at the mode of presentation of subject matter; and the way it is presented can and often does manifest ethical attitudes. This is what aesthetic expert Monroe Beardsley calls "regional properties" (i.e., expressive qualities) Autonomism should be rejected: but that does not yet show that moralism is correct, for one might be an immoralist.
Triff: why does Gaut say that autonomism be rejected? let me ask the question differently: is moralism better because it brings the two branches together? they do it at the expense of making the aesthetic dependent of the ethical (the aesthetic is flawed when the ethical suffers). the autonomist can despise Hitler the individual, and still appreciate his art. I find this a sophisticated position in its complexity.
Immoralism is a little discussed position; yet it is, in my view, a more interesting and powerful rival to moralism than is autonomism. Extreme immoralism holds that the only aesthetic merits of a work of art are its ethical flaws. If so, Marquis de Sade one of the greatest writers of all time, and George Eliot one of the worst. Extreme immoralism is clearly weak.
In contrast, moderate immoralism holds that the ethical flaws of a work can be aesthetic merits in it. This is compatible with holding that sometimes ethical flaws are aesthetic flaws, and also with holding that there is a plurality of aesthetic values.
see that Gaut prefers moderate immoralism over autonomism.
This moderate immoralism looks attractive.Why might one be an immoralist? First, art is sometimes praised for its transgressive or subversive qualities; so if art sometimes subverts our moral values, couldn’t it be ipso facto good? This view is defended by Lawrence Hyman. Hyman claims that there is often a tension or conflict between our aesthetic and ethical responses to works: a work’s aesthetic power can act to undermine our moral values, and the moral resistance we feel can enhance the work’s aesthetic worth.
this is a good point in fact, think of evil characters such as King Lear, Macbeth of Richard III in Shakespeare's plays.Let's use the immoralist argument to defend Gaspar Noe's IRRÉVERSIBLE which movie critic Roger Ebert called "unwatchable". Triff's report: I watched it. I cringed, I cowered, I looked the other way (watched with a group of friends). At the end I didn't know what to say. In time, I have reconsidered the movie a valuable aesthetic experience. The movie is good in its deliverance of the chaos of sex, the futility of depravity, the banality of violence, etc. In some sense the movie makes me much better than a didactic film. in defense of the autonomist I can say that the autonomist can love Irreversible because of its aesthetic qualities, BUT BY AESTHETIC I MEAN THE WHOLE THING. perhaps we could call this view wholistic autonomism. it holds that including relevant moral notes enriches our aesthetic evaluation. Ok, I'm ready for a definition now:
wholistic autonomism: an art work's relevant moral notes can enhance aesthetic evaluations.
Ethically sound works can represent immoral characters and their attitudes without the works sharing those attitudes. But it is the attitudes manifested in a work that are relevant to the dispute between moralists and immoralists.
I don't get it.
A second argument for immoralism appeals not to transgression but to inseparability. The moralist holds, roughly, that a moral flaw in a work is an aesthetic flaw: so it seems he or she should claim that were the moral flaw removed, this would aesthetically improve the work. But, the objection goes,this is clearly false. is the immoralist making that strong a claim?
If on the other hand immoral attitudes are actually embraced by a work, then we can plausibly deny that this is an aesthetic merit: de Sade’s enthusiastic endorsement of sexual torture and enslavement gives one reason to be revolted, not aesthetically enraptured.
triff: hmm, the autonomist would not disagree with this. if the autonomist is ready to defend the work as a whole with its moral flaws, they should be equally ready to critique on the same grounds. WHY? BECAUSE THE NORMATIVE COMPASS IT NOT MORAL BUT AESTHETIC.
Pro tanto (for as much as one is able to) principles are indeed general: it is always the case that an act is bad insofar as it is a lie. But it does not follow that improving an act in a particular respect (by telling the truth) would all things considered improve it. For by improving it in this respect, I might remove some other good-making feature it possesses (such as its being kind). So there may be general pro tanto principles, but there need be no all-things-considered principles. And this is because certain properties of actions are interactive.
A third argument for immoralism appeals to offensive jokes: are not certain jokes funny precisely because they are cruel and wounding, and is that not enough to show that moralism is false (Jacobson 1997: 171–2)?
As thus stated, the objection fails: jokes as a genre are at best analogous to works of art, and moralism is a thesis about works of art, not jokes. Here the immoralist and the autonomist could agree but for different reasons: The autonomist would maintain that jokes are not in the moral sphere.
It's an AS IF... without having to say that it's aesthetically good, precisely because it offends, which seems bizarre. on the other hand one has to agree that in the particular case of comedy (and humor in general) is an aesthetically relevant feature because it is offensive.
Drawing on the strategy just noted, we could agree that the revised play would be less good insofar as its humor was lessened, and might also agree that the play would be, all things considered, aesthetically worse. But we could still consistently hold that there vised play would be aesthetically improved insofar as it was no longer vicious. agree. moralism: holds that a work of art is always aesthetically flawed insofar as it possesses an ethical flaw which is aesthetically relevant. The basic argument appeals to the fact that works of art can teach us, and what they can teach us includes moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. Strong versions of the view even hold that only certain great works of literature, such as the novels of Henry James, can teach us very fine-grained moral truths (Nussbaum 1990).
The moralist holds that a moral flaw in a work is an aesthetic flaw: so it seems he or she should claim that were the moral flaw removed, this would aesthetically improve the work. But, the objection goes,this is clearly false. Some aesthetically good features of a work may depend on its moral flaws: for instance, Riefenstahl’s film is great not just because of the formal beauty of its images, but because of the continuity of its political and aesthetic ideas, the unity of its form and content.
triff: here comes the wholistic autonomist: moral aspects in the work -though relevant- don't need to conflict with its aesthetic role. I can say that "Hitler is wonderfully portrayed," or "the rape scene in Irréversible is very compelling," precisely because its depiction of human depravity. the autonomist is ready to admit (sith the moralist) that literary works of authors like Dostoevsky and Shakespeare, convey important moral insights.
here comes the cognitive ethicist argument: works of art teach us moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. To make this cognitivist argument work it is not enough to show that art can educate us morally. One also has to show that its capacity to teach us is an aesthetic merit in it.
An art work can teach us a great deal about the world without this having anything to do with its artistic merit: photographs of Victorian Britain are an important source of information about that society, but that does not make them better as art works. As noted in the first section, a work is intrinsically ethically flawed just in case it manifests ethically reprehensible attitudes.
When works manifest attitudes, they do so by prescribing or inviting their audiences to have certain responses: de Sade’s Juliette manifests its sadistic attitudes by inviting readers to have erotic responses towards the scenes of sexual torture it depicts. Responses which works prescribe are not always merited: for instance, a horror film invites us to be horrified by the events it recounts, but if those events are ineptly presented, they may merit amusement, not horror.
First, some works of art are ethically deeply flawed, for instance Triumph of the Will, yet they are good, or even great, works of art. That being so, it might be argued that the ethical cannot be aesthetically relevant. Now, the example certainly proves something: if one held that moral merits are the only kind of aesthetic merits which there are, then one must aesthetically condemn the film.
Gaut takes a different approach, for her the aesthetic attitude is defined in terms of detachment or disengagement from practical concerns, being an attitude of pure contemplation towards the aesthetic object (the idea derives from the Kantian notion of disinterest).
ok, this is partly true. though it's not a requirement that the aesthetic is divorced from emotions -as we have learned with my previous lecture on the flavor emotion connection.
However, even if one accepted this disputable characterization, it would not follow that moral considerations played no role in aesthetic assessment. I am forced to take a merely contemplative attitude towards historical figures such as Napoleon, since I can do nothing to alter the past, I could still hold moral views about these individuals.
sure, why not. look at this two propositions: 1. "Hitler was a good watercolorist." 2. "Hitler was a mass murderer." 1. and 2. are independent. Let's add one more: 3. "Hitler loved dogs," which is true. 1. 2. and 3. are independent. they address Hitler "notes". not all of Hitler notes are moral notes.
Our aesthetic interest is directed not just at lines and colors, but also at how the art work presents a certain subject-matter:the ideas and attitudes it manifests towards its subject. Consider Picasso’s great antiwar painting Guernica. Someone who reacted to it merely as a set of line sand colors in Cubist style would be missing out on a central item of aesthetic interest: namely, how Picasso uses Cubist fragmentation to convey something of the horror of war and Fascism. Our aesthetic interest is directed, in part, at the mode of presentation of subject matter; and the way it is presented can and often does manifest ethical attitudes. This is what aesthetic expert Monroe Beardsley calls "regional properties" (i.e., expressive qualities) Autonomism should be rejected: but that does not yet show that moralism is correct, for one might be an immoralist.
Triff: why does Gaut say that autonomism be rejected? let me ask the question differently: is moralism better because it brings the two branches together? they do it at the expense of making the aesthetic dependent of the ethical (the aesthetic is flawed when the ethical suffers). the autonomist can despise Hitler the individual, and still appreciate his art. I find this a sophisticated position in its complexity.
Immoralism is a little discussed position; yet it is, in my view, a more interesting and powerful rival to moralism than is autonomism. Extreme immoralism holds that the only aesthetic merits of a work of art are its ethical flaws. If so, Marquis de Sade one of the greatest writers of all time, and George Eliot one of the worst. Extreme immoralism is clearly weak.
In contrast, moderate immoralism holds that the ethical flaws of a work can be aesthetic merits in it. This is compatible with holding that sometimes ethical flaws are aesthetic flaws, and also with holding that there is a plurality of aesthetic values.
see that Gaut prefers moderate immoralism over autonomism.
This moderate immoralism looks attractive.Why might one be an immoralist? First, art is sometimes praised for its transgressive or subversive qualities; so if art sometimes subverts our moral values, couldn’t it be ipso facto good? This view is defended by Lawrence Hyman. Hyman claims that there is often a tension or conflict between our aesthetic and ethical responses to works: a work’s aesthetic power can act to undermine our moral values, and the moral resistance we feel can enhance the work’s aesthetic worth.
this is a good point in fact, think of evil characters such as King Lear, Macbeth of Richard III in Shakespeare's plays.Let's use the immoralist argument to defend Gaspar Noe's IRRÉVERSIBLE which movie critic Roger Ebert called "unwatchable". Triff's report: I watched it. I cringed, I cowered, I looked the other way (watched with a group of friends). At the end I didn't know what to say. In time, I have reconsidered the movie a valuable aesthetic experience. The movie is good in its deliverance of the chaos of sex, the futility of depravity, the banality of violence, etc. In some sense the movie makes me much better than a didactic film. in defense of the autonomist I can say that the autonomist can love Irreversible because of its aesthetic qualities, BUT BY AESTHETIC I MEAN THE WHOLE THING. perhaps we could call this view wholistic autonomism. it holds that including relevant moral notes enriches our aesthetic evaluation. Ok, I'm ready for a definition now:
wholistic autonomism: an art work's relevant moral notes can enhance aesthetic evaluations.
Ethically sound works can represent immoral characters and their attitudes without the works sharing those attitudes. But it is the attitudes manifested in a work that are relevant to the dispute between moralists and immoralists.
I don't get it.
A second argument for immoralism appeals not to transgression but to inseparability. The moralist holds, roughly, that a moral flaw in a work is an aesthetic flaw: so it seems he or she should claim that were the moral flaw removed, this would aesthetically improve the work. But, the objection goes,this is clearly false. is the immoralist making that strong a claim?
If on the other hand immoral attitudes are actually embraced by a work, then we can plausibly deny that this is an aesthetic merit: de Sade’s enthusiastic endorsement of sexual torture and enslavement gives one reason to be revolted, not aesthetically enraptured.
triff: hmm, the autonomist would not disagree with this. if the autonomist is ready to defend the work as a whole with its moral flaws, they should be equally ready to critique on the same grounds. WHY? BECAUSE THE NORMATIVE COMPASS IT NOT MORAL BUT AESTHETIC.
Pro tanto (for as much as one is able to) principles are indeed general: it is always the case that an act is bad insofar as it is a lie. But it does not follow that improving an act in a particular respect (by telling the truth) would all things considered improve it. For by improving it in this respect, I might remove some other good-making feature it possesses (such as its being kind). So there may be general pro tanto principles, but there need be no all-things-considered principles. And this is because certain properties of actions are interactive.
A third argument for immoralism appeals to offensive jokes: are not certain jokes funny precisely because they are cruel and wounding, and is that not enough to show that moralism is false (Jacobson 1997: 171–2)?
As thus stated, the objection fails: jokes as a genre are at best analogous to works of art, and moralism is a thesis about works of art, not jokes. Here the immoralist and the autonomist could agree but for different reasons: The autonomist would maintain that jokes are not in the moral sphere.
It's an AS IF... without having to say that it's aesthetically good, precisely because it offends, which seems bizarre. on the other hand one has to agree that in the particular case of comedy (and humor in general) is an aesthetically relevant feature because it is offensive.
Drawing on the strategy just noted, we could agree that the revised play would be less good insofar as its humor was lessened, and might also agree that the play would be, all things considered, aesthetically worse. But we could still consistently hold that there vised play would be aesthetically improved insofar as it was no longer vicious. agree. moralism: holds that a work of art is always aesthetically flawed insofar as it possesses an ethical flaw which is aesthetically relevant. The basic argument appeals to the fact that works of art can teach us, and what they can teach us includes moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. Strong versions of the view even hold that only certain great works of literature, such as the novels of Henry James, can teach us very fine-grained moral truths (Nussbaum 1990).
The moralist holds that a moral flaw in a work is an aesthetic flaw: so it seems he or she should claim that were the moral flaw removed, this would aesthetically improve the work. But, the objection goes,this is clearly false. Some aesthetically good features of a work may depend on its moral flaws: for instance, Riefenstahl’s film is great not just because of the formal beauty of its images, but because of the continuity of its political and aesthetic ideas, the unity of its form and content.
triff: here comes the wholistic autonomist: moral aspects in the work -though relevant- don't need to conflict with its aesthetic role. I can say that "Hitler is wonderfully portrayed," or "the rape scene in Irréversible is very compelling," precisely because its depiction of human depravity. the autonomist is ready to admit (sith the moralist) that literary works of authors like Dostoevsky and Shakespeare, convey important moral insights.
here comes the cognitive ethicist argument: works of art teach us moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. To make this cognitivist argument work it is not enough to show that art can educate us morally. One also has to show that its capacity to teach us is an aesthetic merit in it.
An art work can teach us a great deal about the world without this having anything to do with its artistic merit: photographs of Victorian Britain are an important source of information about that society, but that does not make them better as art works. As noted in the first section, a work is intrinsically ethically flawed just in case it manifests ethically reprehensible attitudes.
When works manifest attitudes, they do so by prescribing or inviting their audiences to have certain responses: de Sade’s Juliette manifests its sadistic attitudes by inviting readers to have erotic responses towards the scenes of sexual torture it depicts. Responses which works prescribe are not always merited: for instance, a horror film invites us to be horrified by the events it recounts, but if those events are ineptly presented, they may merit amusement, not horror.
HW 7: justifying ethical claims p. 133-140
let's read the study case in p. 133 "hunter acquitted of manslaughter charge"
1. why did the jurors voted "not guilty" rogerson?
2. explain why they voted this way p. 134.
3. p. 135 offers a different picture. this is called a counter argument. do you find this necessary?
4. what is there about "good reasons" in this case that makes this counter argument compelling?
5. why is it that justification should not be culture-bound?
6. why is it that conflicting ethical claims cannot both be justified?
1. why did the jurors voted "not guilty" rogerson?
2. explain why they voted this way p. 134.
3. p. 135 offers a different picture. this is called a counter argument. do you find this necessary?
4. what is there about "good reasons" in this case that makes this counter argument compelling?
5. why is it that justification should not be culture-bound?
6. why is it that conflicting ethical claims cannot both be justified?
Saturday, February 20, 2016
phi 2604 test #2, topics for review (chapters 4 & 5)
1. Difference between consequentialist theories and Formalist theories.
Consequentialism is the theory that judges the rightness or wrongness of an action in terms of its consequences. Formalism is the theory that judges the rightness or wrongness of an action in terms of the action's form (i.e., "killing is wrong": the formalist believes that moral actions are objective).
2. Intrinsic value (value for its own sake; personhood is an essential value: a-reason, b-autonomy, c-sentience, d-freedom) and instrumental values (value for the sake of something else).
3. Psychological egoism: everyone always acts solely out of self-interest. This is an interesting claim because it entails that altruistic behavior (behavior done solely for the sake of the other person) does not exist. Even when someone like Mother Teresa appears to be acting for the sake of other people, in actuality she is doing what she does because—according to the psychological egoist—it makes her feel better.
4. Ethical egoism: What makes an action right is that it promotes one's best interest. This is equivalent to a calculus of prudence. C/A Moral agents are mot mere instruments for one's interest. (b) some claim that ethical egoism is not really an ethical theory. Whatever disagreements may exist among ethicists, one thing that most of them agree on is that morality is about overcoming our immediate calculations and caring for the well-being of other people for their own sake.
Click here for my notes on ethical egoism,
5. Act Utilitarianism (or Traditional utilitarianism): What makes an action right is that it maximizes happiness everyone considered (remember this is only a particular milieu: family, class, Miami, Florida, the USA).
Click here for my notes to utilitarianism,
Rule utilitarianism: what makes an action right is that it falls under a rule which if followed would maximize happiness, everyone considered.
Rule utilitarianism seems to solve some of the problems presented by traditional utilitarianism.
TAKE A LOOK AT THE GLOSSARY ON PAGES 363- 366
Consequentialism is the theory that judges the rightness or wrongness of an action in terms of its consequences. Formalism is the theory that judges the rightness or wrongness of an action in terms of the action's form (i.e., "killing is wrong": the formalist believes that moral actions are objective).
2. Intrinsic value (value for its own sake; personhood is an essential value: a-reason, b-autonomy, c-sentience, d-freedom) and instrumental values (value for the sake of something else).
3. Psychological egoism: everyone always acts solely out of self-interest. This is an interesting claim because it entails that altruistic behavior (behavior done solely for the sake of the other person) does not exist. Even when someone like Mother Teresa appears to be acting for the sake of other people, in actuality she is doing what she does because—according to the psychological egoist—it makes her feel better.
4. Ethical egoism: What makes an action right is that it promotes one's best interest. This is equivalent to a calculus of prudence. C/A Moral agents are mot mere instruments for one's interest. (b) some claim that ethical egoism is not really an ethical theory. Whatever disagreements may exist among ethicists, one thing that most of them agree on is that morality is about overcoming our immediate calculations and caring for the well-being of other people for their own sake.
Click here for my notes on ethical egoism,
5. Act Utilitarianism (or Traditional utilitarianism): What makes an action right is that it maximizes happiness everyone considered (remember this is only a particular milieu: family, class, Miami, Florida, the USA).
Click here for my notes to utilitarianism,
Rule utilitarianism: what makes an action right is that it falls under a rule which if followed would maximize happiness, everyone considered.
Rule utilitarianism seems to solve some of the problems presented by traditional utilitarianism.
TAKE A LOOK AT THE GLOSSARY ON PAGES 363- 366
Sunday, February 14, 2016
ART EXPRESSION AND EMOTION chapter 30 reading
classical expression theory
A poem can express sadness without representing a sad state of affairs. More obviously, to take a medium that is not representational, a piece of music can be sad. What we need is some way of making sense of these uses of the emotion terms.
Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that other people are infected by these feelings and also experience them.-- L. Tolstoi.
the classic expression theory: the artist expresses "sadness" to the audience by causing the work to possess P (P causes sadness).
counter: a problem is that for this to be true P must be the vehicle for the artist’s expression. How is this to be explained?
the point is that if F causes P, F &P must be logically independent, otherwise they fall victim to the genetic fallacy. ex. if "my moving" is caused by your "ordering me to move," you can see that "ordering to move" and "my moving" are not logically connected in the same manner than "all triangles have 3 sides".
sircello argues that in virtue of their artistic acts and of the similarity they bear to common kinds of expressions, works of art may serve as expressions of those feelings, emotions, attitudes, moods and/or personal characteristic. so, to see a smile is not to see an appearance and infer a happy state of mind, but to see the happy state of mind in the face itself. The ‘act’ and the ‘thing’ are inseparable.
well known aesthetician Richard Wollheim defends this view as such: Human beings have the capacity to ‘project’ their internal states on to natural objects, a capacity that is rooted deep in our psychology. The objects on to which we project state F (for example) are those which ‘correspond’ to F. A rocky landscape with a solitary tree, for instance, might correspond to melancholy.
The semantic theory
defended by Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art (1976). It attempts to explain the central features of art within a theory of symbols. A expresses E, according to Goodman, 1. A possesses E metaphorically, and 2. if A exemplifies E.
For A to possess E metaphorically, is for A to fall within the extension of E used as a metaphor. For example, a picture may possess ‘square’ literally, and ‘sad’ metaphorically. An object exemplifies a predicate or property if it refers to it.
Exemplification is possession plus reference. Hence, our picture not only is sad, it exemplifies sadness. For Goodman a term with an extension established by habit is applied elsewhere under the influence of that habit; there is both a departure from and deference to precedent.
this is a little bit of appealing to prior consensus.
what is it about the picture that justifies the application of "sad" to it, albeit metaphorically? metaphorical possession of a property IS NOT not as a linguistic fact, but as a way an object might possess a property.
so, for example, does Guernica by Picasso "posses" the property of horror?
does Guernica refers to "horror"?
the local quality theory
expression is to be analyzed in terms of expressive qualities which are recognized in works of art. such qualities can be analyzed independently of the state of mind of their creator.
the predicate needs to pick out a property of the work of art that is sufficiently akin to the natural expression of emotion to avoid the ambiguity. A popular candidate in the literature is resemblance between the purely musical properties (in particular, movement) and the natural expression of emotion. 1. a person or object can present the appearance of sadness without actually being sad. 2. resemblance is a property of the music and presumably can be experienced as such.
is this melody sad? (it's in a minor key, we talked about this). does it have the property?
do you think the creator didn't think of sadness?
A poem can express sadness without representing a sad state of affairs. More obviously, to take a medium that is not representational, a piece of music can be sad. What we need is some way of making sense of these uses of the emotion terms.
Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that other people are infected by these feelings and also experience them.-- L. Tolstoi.
the classic expression theory: the artist expresses "sadness" to the audience by causing the work to possess P (P causes sadness).
counter: a problem is that for this to be true P must be the vehicle for the artist’s expression. How is this to be explained?
the point is that if F causes P, F &P must be logically independent, otherwise they fall victim to the genetic fallacy. ex. if "my moving" is caused by your "ordering me to move," you can see that "ordering to move" and "my moving" are not logically connected in the same manner than "all triangles have 3 sides".
sircello argues that in virtue of their artistic acts and of the similarity they bear to common kinds of expressions, works of art may serve as expressions of those feelings, emotions, attitudes, moods and/or personal characteristic. so, to see a smile is not to see an appearance and infer a happy state of mind, but to see the happy state of mind in the face itself. The ‘act’ and the ‘thing’ are inseparable.
well known aesthetician Richard Wollheim defends this view as such: Human beings have the capacity to ‘project’ their internal states on to natural objects, a capacity that is rooted deep in our psychology. The objects on to which we project state F (for example) are those which ‘correspond’ to F. A rocky landscape with a solitary tree, for instance, might correspond to melancholy.
The semantic theory
defended by Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art (1976). It attempts to explain the central features of art within a theory of symbols. A expresses E, according to Goodman, 1. A possesses E metaphorically, and 2. if A exemplifies E.
For A to possess E metaphorically, is for A to fall within the extension of E used as a metaphor. For example, a picture may possess ‘square’ literally, and ‘sad’ metaphorically. An object exemplifies a predicate or property if it refers to it.
Exemplification is possession plus reference. Hence, our picture not only is sad, it exemplifies sadness. For Goodman a term with an extension established by habit is applied elsewhere under the influence of that habit; there is both a departure from and deference to precedent.
this is a little bit of appealing to prior consensus.
what is it about the picture that justifies the application of "sad" to it, albeit metaphorically? metaphorical possession of a property IS NOT not as a linguistic fact, but as a way an object might possess a property.
so, for example, does Guernica by Picasso "posses" the property of horror?
does Guernica refers to "horror"?
the local quality theory
expression is to be analyzed in terms of expressive qualities which are recognized in works of art. such qualities can be analyzed independently of the state of mind of their creator.
the predicate needs to pick out a property of the work of art that is sufficiently akin to the natural expression of emotion to avoid the ambiguity. A popular candidate in the literature is resemblance between the purely musical properties (in particular, movement) and the natural expression of emotion. 1. a person or object can present the appearance of sadness without actually being sad. 2. resemblance is a property of the music and presumably can be experienced as such.
is this melody sad? (it's in a minor key, we talked about this). does it have the property?
do you think the creator didn't think of sadness?
homework #5, utilitarianism
1. What is consequentialism?
2. What is traditional utilitarianism? Does it make sense in the case of the trolley experiment? Explain why.
3. What is the problem with distributing utility?
4. Do you agree with Brandt's Utilitarian Heir counterexample? Explain why.
5. What's rule utilitarianism? How would a rule utilitarian respond to Brandt's Utilitarian Heir counterexample? Explain.
6. Are utilitarians allowed to give any special weight to consequences that would afflict them personally when happiness to the majority is at stake?
7. Which theory do you feel more drawn to, Egoism or Utilitarianism? Explain why.
Friday, February 12, 2016
CRITICISM, reading chapter 27
Legislative criticism: treats artistic AW as something up for refined discrimination and a self-conscious education in taste.
Basically it tells you what, it speaks with conviction and assuredness. NOT A PROBLEM GIVEN THESE DAYS OF DUMB DOWN VALUES.
A bit later, the romantic shift of power from critic or theorist to the artist elicited the need for the interpretation of works of genius, and so the critic now was not so much a judge of quality as a guide to the significance of works of art.
These changes meant that critics became reviewers, reappraisers,and interpreters rather than legislative theorists, although the earlier role lingered on in the imperiously judgemental tone that much early reviewing took.
there is a difference between critique and review. in the second you make descriptive comments about it and withhold evaluation. in the first you evaluate. CALL A SPADE A SPADE, IF YOU'RE WRONG YOU'RE WRONG. AS SIMPLE AS THAT.
Appreciative description: In appreciative description the critic functions as an intermediary between the work and the audience. The critic is presumed to have better taste, greater sensitivity to meaning, and more extensive relevant knowledge than the audience.
isn't that what one wants from the critic? to get x-tra valuable info?
... we are never absolutely sure we have correctly identified a WA, and, therefore, the rock critic reviewing his favorite band is, in principle, in the same position as the art historian commenting on Greek vases: they must both identify the AW, which gives them the relevant criteria for description and appraisal. In practice, however, the difference between intimacy and remoteness is crucial. If the rock critic had to explain his view to someone unfamiliar with the tradition and current bands, he would be giving a course not writing a review.
when going back, WEAR THE RIGHT GLASSES!
Such criticism can, however, have the paradoxical effect of making the work more distant experientially, even though it may be better understood.
so what, distant is only because it's not understood. if something is understood it's already NEAR.
The next and most important stage in the critical journey is reached when critics are on intimate terms with performances and can presume that audiences share the relevant contexts.
SURE,
Such criticism does not consist of arguments in support of verdicts, but of efforts of the critic to express through appreciative description the basis upon which a work is judged. Appreciative description is “discourse grounding evaluation,” and evaluation is implicit in the description itself.
this is cool. when the critic finds a word that simultaneously describes and evaluates.
this is what Nicolas Penny writes:
you take the work and basically deconstruct it. the advantage is analysis, the disadvantage is it tends to disconnect with readers.
Interpretive criticism: The interpretive criticism that produces significance is usually directed to canonical works, and it serves a function similar to that of the re-staging of dramatic works. Both provide continuity not by historical reconstruction, which takes us backward in time, but through the making of meanings that bring them forward to us. For example, this one by Simone Weil:
Cultural criticism: This notion of criticism comes from Marx’s ‘critical criticism’ and Matthew Arnold in “The Study of Criticism at the Present Time,” where he contrasts it to “polemical practical criticism.” Criticism has here almost wholly lost its meaning as discourse grounding the evaluation of performances, and instead uses commentary on art and culture as a basis for social criticism.
what you do is take the AW and put it in a socio-political context and talk about it from that angle. it helps to see it in context, but as you move out of the AW one looses detail.
Basically it tells you what, it speaks with conviction and assuredness. NOT A PROBLEM GIVEN THESE DAYS OF DUMB DOWN VALUES.
A bit later, the romantic shift of power from critic or theorist to the artist elicited the need for the interpretation of works of genius, and so the critic now was not so much a judge of quality as a guide to the significance of works of art.
These changes meant that critics became reviewers, reappraisers,and interpreters rather than legislative theorists, although the earlier role lingered on in the imperiously judgemental tone that much early reviewing took.
there is a difference between critique and review. in the second you make descriptive comments about it and withhold evaluation. in the first you evaluate. CALL A SPADE A SPADE, IF YOU'RE WRONG YOU'RE WRONG. AS SIMPLE AS THAT.
Appreciative description: In appreciative description the critic functions as an intermediary between the work and the audience. The critic is presumed to have better taste, greater sensitivity to meaning, and more extensive relevant knowledge than the audience.
isn't that what one wants from the critic? to get x-tra valuable info?
... we are never absolutely sure we have correctly identified a WA, and, therefore, the rock critic reviewing his favorite band is, in principle, in the same position as the art historian commenting on Greek vases: they must both identify the AW, which gives them the relevant criteria for description and appraisal. In practice, however, the difference between intimacy and remoteness is crucial. If the rock critic had to explain his view to someone unfamiliar with the tradition and current bands, he would be giving a course not writing a review.
when going back, WEAR THE RIGHT GLASSES!
Such criticism can, however, have the paradoxical effect of making the work more distant experientially, even though it may be better understood.
so what, distant is only because it's not understood. if something is understood it's already NEAR.
The next and most important stage in the critical journey is reached when critics are on intimate terms with performances and can presume that audiences share the relevant contexts.
SURE,
Such criticism does not consist of arguments in support of verdicts, but of efforts of the critic to express through appreciative description the basis upon which a work is judged. Appreciative description is “discourse grounding evaluation,” and evaluation is implicit in the description itself.
this is cool. when the critic finds a word that simultaneously describes and evaluates.
coreggio, the mystical marriage of st. catherine
this is what Nicolas Penny writes:
In the center of the most beautiful painting by Correggio in the Louvre there is a knot of flesh as intricate and lively as a swimming octopus. It consists of the left hand of the Virgin Mary delicately supporting the slightly smaller right hand of Saint Catherine, while the much smaller hand of the infant Christ tenderly picks out the Saint’s ring finger. This is a miniature example of an effect at which Correggio excelled: actions inspired by a sentiment of breathless intensity are somehow endowed with angelic grace and with a formal complexity which is delightfully difficult to disentangle.Analytic criticism: Analytic criticism is closely tied to a formalist theory of the arts that takes the underlying organization of works of art as their distinctive value,thus subordinating the mimetic and expressive appearances that are dominant in descriptive criticism. Formal analysis, of which New Criticism is perhaps the best-known school, claims that it can analyze out and reveal the very structure or principle of formal organization in AW.
you take the work and basically deconstruct it. the advantage is analysis, the disadvantage is it tends to disconnect with readers.
Interpretive criticism: The interpretive criticism that produces significance is usually directed to canonical works, and it serves a function similar to that of the re-staging of dramatic works. Both provide continuity not by historical reconstruction, which takes us backward in time, but through the making of meanings that bring them forward to us. For example, this one by Simone Weil:
The true hero, the true subject, the center of the Iliad is force. Force employed by man, force that enslaves man, force before which man shrinks away....The cold brutality of the deeds of war is left undisguised; neither victors nor vanquished are admired, scorned, or hated. . .. As for the warriors, victors or vanquished, those comparisons which liken them to beasts or things can inspire neither admiration nor contempt, but only regret that men are capable of being so transformed.problem here is interpretation itself,
Cultural criticism: This notion of criticism comes from Marx’s ‘critical criticism’ and Matthew Arnold in “The Study of Criticism at the Present Time,” where he contrasts it to “polemical practical criticism.” Criticism has here almost wholly lost its meaning as discourse grounding the evaluation of performances, and instead uses commentary on art and culture as a basis for social criticism.
what you do is take the AW and put it in a socio-political context and talk about it from that angle. it helps to see it in context, but as you move out of the AW one looses detail.
Wednesday, February 10, 2016
Review (First Exam)
Opinion: A belief or conclusion held with confidence but not substantiated by positive knowledge or proof.
Belief: A mental state of acceptance.
Subjectivism: The truth of moral judgments is dependent upon people's beliefs.
Objectivism: The truth of moral judgments is independent of people's beliefs.
Relativism: Truth is relative to point of view (subjectivism), culture (cultural relativism).
Moral relativism: same as above, but now concerning moral judgments. So, moral judgments are not true independent of people's point of view or culture.
Justification: something, such as facts or reasons given to hold a belief.
Grounds for justification: In Ethics it means the elimination of bias, of subjective or relative elements.
1. We verify them or falsify them over time.
2. Someone else (regardless of her cultural biases) can verify or falsify the.
3. The justification withstands rational criticism.
Kantian Respect: treat people as ends in themselves, not as means to an end.
The idea of respect is symmetrical: We have an obligation to treat people with respect since we'd like to be treated with respect.
Knowledge: Justified true belief. Ethics involves non-relative claims.
Ethics: The study of moral norms and systems.
Human rights/// Positive Rights: Positive rights usually oblige action, for example: welfare rights. Negative Rights: Negative Rights oblige inaction, for example: private property, freedom of speech, etc.
Culture: The arts, beliefs, customs, institutions, and other products of human work and thought considered as a unit, especially with regard to a particular time or social group. Subculture: A particular group within the more general group.
Reasons and "good reasons": A reason is a consideration that justifies or explains. Not all reasons given are equally good. Good reasons are those that are generally binding to members across cultures.
Neutrality: We should consider the claims of all persons as equally biding.
Ethical perspective: ethical empathy means imagining oneself as victim: being stolen to, being cheated, being the victim of discrimination, etc.
Difference between "being ethical" and "being practical" ---> what "we ought to do" vs. what "we'll probably do."
More on rights and respect HERE.
Thursday, February 4, 2016
HW 7 (a bit of chapters 2 and 3)
1. examine the two cases on p. 67 and 68. what is your take?
2. what is the difference between being ethical and being "practical"? p. 69, 70
3. why is "knowing what to do" often not enough in these cases?
4. is there is a difference between short-term interests to oneself and duties to oneself? p.70, 71
chapter 4 (The Justification of Ethical Claims)
1. what is the difference between justification and explanation? p. 127
2. what is considered "good reasons" in ethics? p. 128, 129
3. explain the difference between normative and descriptive terms.
4. how do we recognize "poor" or "bad" ethical reasoning? p. 129, 130
2. what is the difference between being ethical and being "practical"? p. 69, 70
3. why is "knowing what to do" often not enough in these cases?
4. is there is a difference between short-term interests to oneself and duties to oneself? p.70, 71
chapter 4 (The Justification of Ethical Claims)
1. what is the difference between justification and explanation? p. 127
2. what is considered "good reasons" in ethics? p. 128, 129
3. explain the difference between normative and descriptive terms.
4. how do we recognize "poor" or "bad" ethical reasoning? p. 129, 130
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