The relation of art to ethics has been at the forefront of several recent controversies about art.
Consider the following:
1. the protests over the sexism and violence seemingly advocated in the music of ‘gangsta’ rappers such as Ice-T;
2. the controversy over the violence of many Hollywood movies, such as Natural Born Killers;
3. the fatwa declared against Salman Rushdie for publishing The Satanic Verses.
Art has the power to disturb, power to pummel against the bulwarks of our ethical convictions.
are the ethical flaws (or merits) of works of art also aesthetic flaws (or merits) in them?
Consider Leni Riefenstahl’s famous film, Triumph of the Will, which is a glowingly enthusiastic account of the 1934 Nuremberg Nazi Party rally. Is the film aesthetically flawed because of its advocacy of Hitler’s cause? It has frequently been denounced as bad art because of its message. Or is its immoral stance simply an irrelevance to its merit as a work of art? So we have three positions:
_________
Aestheticism (autonomism) holds that ethical assessment is irrelevant to aesthetic assessment.
_________
Aestheticism (autonomism) holds that ethical assessment is irrelevant to aesthetic assessment.
Immoralism holds that works of art may be aesthetically good because of their ethical flaws.
Moralism (or ethicism) in contrast holds that works of art are aesthetically bad because of their ethical flaws.
Autonomists acknowledge that although ethics and aesthetics are normative disciplines, they are very different in scope. Aesthetics evaluates beautiful non-beautiful, ethics evaluates right, wrong,
Aesthetic works -unlike moral actions- are not "actions" of fundamental consequence for human welfare, (this is granting that artworks could be considered actions).
Autonomists acknowledge that although ethics and aesthetics are normative disciplines, they are very different in scope. Aesthetics evaluates beautiful non-beautiful, ethics evaluates right, wrong,
Aesthetic works -unlike moral actions- are not "actions" of fundamental consequence for human welfare, (this is granting that artworks could be considered actions).
How about an art performance. It looks like an "action," but it's a pretending one... the action is not real, moral actions, on the other hand, should be considered real actions.
First, some works of art are ethically deeply flawed, for instance Triumph of the Will, yet they are good, or even great, works of art. That being so, it might be argued that the ethical cannot be aesthetically relevant. Now, the example certainly proves something: if one held that moral merits are the only kind of aesthetic merits which there are, then one must aesthetically condemn the film.
Gaut takes a different approach, for her the aesthetic attitude is defined in terms of detachment or disengagement from practical concerns, being an attitude of pure contemplation towards the aesthetic object (the idea derives from the Kantian notion of disinterest).
ok, this is partly true. though it's not a requirement that the aesthetic is divorced from emotions -as we have learned with my previous lecture on the flavor emotion connection.
However, even if one accepted this disputable characterization, it would not follow that moral considerations played no role in aesthetic assessment. I am forced to take a merely contemplative attitude towards historical figures such as Napoleon, since I can do nothing to alter the past, I could still hold moral views about these individuals.
sure, why not. look at this two propositions: 1. "Hitler was a good watercolorist." 2. "Hitler was a mass murderer." 1. and 2. are independent. Let's add one more: 3. "Hitler loved dogs," which is true. 1. 2. and 3. are independent. they address Hitler "notes". not all of Hitler notes are moral notes.
Our aesthetic interest is directed not just at lines and colors, but also at how the art work presents a certain subject-matter:the ideas and attitudes it manifests towards its subject. Consider Picasso’s great antiwar painting Guernica. Someone who reacted to it merely as a set of line sand colors in Cubist style would be missing out on a central item of aesthetic interest: namely, how Picasso uses Cubist fragmentation to convey something of the horror of war and Fascism. Our aesthetic interest is directed, in part, at the mode of presentation of subject matter; and the way it is presented can and often does manifest ethical attitudes. This is what aesthetic expert Monroe Beardsley calls "regional properties" (i.e., expressive qualities) Autonomism should be rejected: but that does not yet show that moralism is correct, for one might be an immoralist.
Triff: why does Gaut say that autonomism be rejected? let me ask the question differently: is moralism better because it brings the two branches together? they do it at the expense of making the aesthetic dependent of the ethical (the aesthetic is flawed when the ethical suffers). the autonomist can despise Hitler the individual, and still appreciate his art. I find this a sophisticated position in its complexity.
Immoralism is a little discussed position; yet it is, in my view, a more interesting and powerful rival to moralism than is autonomism. Extreme immoralism holds that the only aesthetic merits of a work of art are its ethical flaws. If so, Marquis de Sade one of the greatest writers of all time, and George Eliot one of the worst. Extreme immoralism is clearly weak.
In contrast, moderate immoralism holds that the ethical flaws of a work can be aesthetic merits in it. This is compatible with holding that sometimes ethical flaws are aesthetic flaws, and also with holding that there is a plurality of aesthetic values.
see that Gaut prefers moderate immoralism over autonomism.
This moderate immoralism looks attractive.Why might one be an immoralist? First, art is sometimes praised for its transgressive or subversive qualities; so if art sometimes subverts our moral values, couldn’t it be ipso facto good? This view is defended by Lawrence Hyman. Hyman claims that there is often a tension or conflict between our aesthetic and ethical responses to works: a work’s aesthetic power can act to undermine our moral values, and the moral resistance we feel can enhance the work’s aesthetic worth.
this is a good point in fact, think of evil characters such as King Lear, Macbeth of Richard III in Shakespeare's plays.Let's use the immoralist argument to defend Gaspar Noe's IRRÉVERSIBLE which movie critic Roger Ebert called "unwatchable". Triff's report: I watched it. I cringed, I cowered, I looked the other way (watched with a group of friends). At the end I didn't know what to say. In time, I have reconsidered the movie a valuable aesthetic experience. The movie is good in its deliverance of the chaos of sex, the futility of depravity, the banality of violence, etc. In some sense the movie makes me much better than a didactic film. in defense of the autonomist I can say that the autonomist can love Irreversible because of its aesthetic qualities, BUT BY AESTHETIC I MEAN THE WHOLE THING. perhaps we could call this view wholistic autonomism. it holds that including relevant moral notes enriches our aesthetic evaluation. Ok, I'm ready for a definition now:
wholistic autonomism: an art work's relevant moral notes can enhance aesthetic evaluations.
Ethically sound works can represent immoral characters and their attitudes without the works sharing those attitudes. But it is the attitudes manifested in a work that are relevant to the dispute between moralists and immoralists.
I don't get it.
A second argument for immoralism appeals not to transgression but to inseparability. The moralist holds, roughly, that a moral flaw in a work is an aesthetic flaw: so it seems he or she should claim that were the moral flaw removed, this would aesthetically improve the work. But, the objection goes,this is clearly false. is the immoralist making that strong a claim?
If on the other hand immoral attitudes are actually embraced by a work, then we can plausibly deny that this is an aesthetic merit: de Sade’s enthusiastic endorsement of sexual torture and enslavement gives one reason to be revolted, not aesthetically enraptured.
triff: hmm, the autonomist would not disagree with this. if the autonomist is ready to defend the work as a whole with its moral flaws, they should be equally ready to critique on the same grounds. WHY? BECAUSE THE NORMATIVE COMPASS IT NOT MORAL BUT AESTHETIC.
Pro tanto (for as much as one is able to) principles are indeed general: it is always the case that an act is bad insofar as it is a lie. But it does not follow that improving an act in a particular respect (by telling the truth) would all things considered improve it. For by improving it in this respect, I might remove some other good-making feature it possesses (such as its being kind). So there may be general pro tanto principles, but there need be no all-things-considered principles. And this is because certain properties of actions are interactive.
A third argument for immoralism appeals to offensive jokes: are not certain jokes funny precisely because they are cruel and wounding, and is that not enough to show that moralism is false (Jacobson 1997: 171–2)?
As thus stated, the objection fails: jokes as a genre are at best analogous to works of art, and moralism is a thesis about works of art, not jokes. Here the immoralist and the autonomist could agree but for different reasons: The autonomist would maintain that jokes are not in the moral sphere.
It's an AS IF... without having to say that it's aesthetically good, precisely because it offends, which seems bizarre. on the other hand one has to agree that in the particular case of comedy (and humor in general) is an aesthetically relevant feature because it is offensive.
Drawing on the strategy just noted, we could agree that the revised play would be less good insofar as its humor was lessened, and might also agree that the play would be, all things considered, aesthetically worse. But we could still consistently hold that there vised play would be aesthetically improved insofar as it was no longer vicious. agree. moralism: holds that a work of art is always aesthetically flawed insofar as it possesses an ethical flaw which is aesthetically relevant. The basic argument appeals to the fact that works of art can teach us, and what they can teach us includes moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. Strong versions of the view even hold that only certain great works of literature, such as the novels of Henry James, can teach us very fine-grained moral truths (Nussbaum 1990).
The moralist holds that a moral flaw in a work is an aesthetic flaw: so it seems he or she should claim that were the moral flaw removed, this would aesthetically improve the work. But, the objection goes,this is clearly false. Some aesthetically good features of a work may depend on its moral flaws: for instance, Riefenstahl’s film is great not just because of the formal beauty of its images, but because of the continuity of its political and aesthetic ideas, the unity of its form and content.
triff: here comes the wholistic autonomist: moral aspects in the work -though relevant- don't need to conflict with its aesthetic role. I can say that "Hitler is wonderfully portrayed," or "the rape scene in Irréversible is very compelling," precisely because its depiction of human depravity. the autonomist is ready to admit (sith the moralist) that literary works of authors like Dostoevsky and Shakespeare, convey important moral insights.
here comes the cognitive ethicist argument: works of art teach us moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. To make this cognitivist argument work it is not enough to show that art can educate us morally. One also has to show that its capacity to teach us is an aesthetic merit in it.
An art work can teach us a great deal about the world without this having anything to do with its artistic merit: photographs of Victorian Britain are an important source of information about that society, but that does not make them better as art works. As noted in the first section, a work is intrinsically ethically flawed just in case it manifests ethically reprehensible attitudes.
When works manifest attitudes, they do so by prescribing or inviting their audiences to have certain responses: de Sade’s Juliette manifests its sadistic attitudes by inviting readers to have erotic responses towards the scenes of sexual torture it depicts. Responses which works prescribe are not always merited: for instance, a horror film invites us to be horrified by the events it recounts, but if those events are ineptly presented, they may merit amusement, not horror.
First, some works of art are ethically deeply flawed, for instance Triumph of the Will, yet they are good, or even great, works of art. That being so, it might be argued that the ethical cannot be aesthetically relevant. Now, the example certainly proves something: if one held that moral merits are the only kind of aesthetic merits which there are, then one must aesthetically condemn the film.
Gaut takes a different approach, for her the aesthetic attitude is defined in terms of detachment or disengagement from practical concerns, being an attitude of pure contemplation towards the aesthetic object (the idea derives from the Kantian notion of disinterest).
ok, this is partly true. though it's not a requirement that the aesthetic is divorced from emotions -as we have learned with my previous lecture on the flavor emotion connection.
However, even if one accepted this disputable characterization, it would not follow that moral considerations played no role in aesthetic assessment. I am forced to take a merely contemplative attitude towards historical figures such as Napoleon, since I can do nothing to alter the past, I could still hold moral views about these individuals.
sure, why not. look at this two propositions: 1. "Hitler was a good watercolorist." 2. "Hitler was a mass murderer." 1. and 2. are independent. Let's add one more: 3. "Hitler loved dogs," which is true. 1. 2. and 3. are independent. they address Hitler "notes". not all of Hitler notes are moral notes.
Our aesthetic interest is directed not just at lines and colors, but also at how the art work presents a certain subject-matter:the ideas and attitudes it manifests towards its subject. Consider Picasso’s great antiwar painting Guernica. Someone who reacted to it merely as a set of line sand colors in Cubist style would be missing out on a central item of aesthetic interest: namely, how Picasso uses Cubist fragmentation to convey something of the horror of war and Fascism. Our aesthetic interest is directed, in part, at the mode of presentation of subject matter; and the way it is presented can and often does manifest ethical attitudes. This is what aesthetic expert Monroe Beardsley calls "regional properties" (i.e., expressive qualities) Autonomism should be rejected: but that does not yet show that moralism is correct, for one might be an immoralist.
Triff: why does Gaut say that autonomism be rejected? let me ask the question differently: is moralism better because it brings the two branches together? they do it at the expense of making the aesthetic dependent of the ethical (the aesthetic is flawed when the ethical suffers). the autonomist can despise Hitler the individual, and still appreciate his art. I find this a sophisticated position in its complexity.
Immoralism is a little discussed position; yet it is, in my view, a more interesting and powerful rival to moralism than is autonomism. Extreme immoralism holds that the only aesthetic merits of a work of art are its ethical flaws. If so, Marquis de Sade one of the greatest writers of all time, and George Eliot one of the worst. Extreme immoralism is clearly weak.
In contrast, moderate immoralism holds that the ethical flaws of a work can be aesthetic merits in it. This is compatible with holding that sometimes ethical flaws are aesthetic flaws, and also with holding that there is a plurality of aesthetic values.
see that Gaut prefers moderate immoralism over autonomism.
This moderate immoralism looks attractive.Why might one be an immoralist? First, art is sometimes praised for its transgressive or subversive qualities; so if art sometimes subverts our moral values, couldn’t it be ipso facto good? This view is defended by Lawrence Hyman. Hyman claims that there is often a tension or conflict between our aesthetic and ethical responses to works: a work’s aesthetic power can act to undermine our moral values, and the moral resistance we feel can enhance the work’s aesthetic worth.
this is a good point in fact, think of evil characters such as King Lear, Macbeth of Richard III in Shakespeare's plays.Let's use the immoralist argument to defend Gaspar Noe's IRRÉVERSIBLE which movie critic Roger Ebert called "unwatchable". Triff's report: I watched it. I cringed, I cowered, I looked the other way (watched with a group of friends). At the end I didn't know what to say. In time, I have reconsidered the movie a valuable aesthetic experience. The movie is good in its deliverance of the chaos of sex, the futility of depravity, the banality of violence, etc. In some sense the movie makes me much better than a didactic film. in defense of the autonomist I can say that the autonomist can love Irreversible because of its aesthetic qualities, BUT BY AESTHETIC I MEAN THE WHOLE THING. perhaps we could call this view wholistic autonomism. it holds that including relevant moral notes enriches our aesthetic evaluation. Ok, I'm ready for a definition now:
wholistic autonomism: an art work's relevant moral notes can enhance aesthetic evaluations.
Ethically sound works can represent immoral characters and their attitudes without the works sharing those attitudes. But it is the attitudes manifested in a work that are relevant to the dispute between moralists and immoralists.
I don't get it.
A second argument for immoralism appeals not to transgression but to inseparability. The moralist holds, roughly, that a moral flaw in a work is an aesthetic flaw: so it seems he or she should claim that were the moral flaw removed, this would aesthetically improve the work. But, the objection goes,this is clearly false. is the immoralist making that strong a claim?
If on the other hand immoral attitudes are actually embraced by a work, then we can plausibly deny that this is an aesthetic merit: de Sade’s enthusiastic endorsement of sexual torture and enslavement gives one reason to be revolted, not aesthetically enraptured.
triff: hmm, the autonomist would not disagree with this. if the autonomist is ready to defend the work as a whole with its moral flaws, they should be equally ready to critique on the same grounds. WHY? BECAUSE THE NORMATIVE COMPASS IT NOT MORAL BUT AESTHETIC.
Pro tanto (for as much as one is able to) principles are indeed general: it is always the case that an act is bad insofar as it is a lie. But it does not follow that improving an act in a particular respect (by telling the truth) would all things considered improve it. For by improving it in this respect, I might remove some other good-making feature it possesses (such as its being kind). So there may be general pro tanto principles, but there need be no all-things-considered principles. And this is because certain properties of actions are interactive.
A third argument for immoralism appeals to offensive jokes: are not certain jokes funny precisely because they are cruel and wounding, and is that not enough to show that moralism is false (Jacobson 1997: 171–2)?
As thus stated, the objection fails: jokes as a genre are at best analogous to works of art, and moralism is a thesis about works of art, not jokes. Here the immoralist and the autonomist could agree but for different reasons: The autonomist would maintain that jokes are not in the moral sphere.
It's an AS IF... without having to say that it's aesthetically good, precisely because it offends, which seems bizarre. on the other hand one has to agree that in the particular case of comedy (and humor in general) is an aesthetically relevant feature because it is offensive.
Drawing on the strategy just noted, we could agree that the revised play would be less good insofar as its humor was lessened, and might also agree that the play would be, all things considered, aesthetically worse. But we could still consistently hold that there vised play would be aesthetically improved insofar as it was no longer vicious. agree. moralism: holds that a work of art is always aesthetically flawed insofar as it possesses an ethical flaw which is aesthetically relevant. The basic argument appeals to the fact that works of art can teach us, and what they can teach us includes moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. Strong versions of the view even hold that only certain great works of literature, such as the novels of Henry James, can teach us very fine-grained moral truths (Nussbaum 1990).
The moralist holds that a moral flaw in a work is an aesthetic flaw: so it seems he or she should claim that were the moral flaw removed, this would aesthetically improve the work. But, the objection goes,this is clearly false. Some aesthetically good features of a work may depend on its moral flaws: for instance, Riefenstahl’s film is great not just because of the formal beauty of its images, but because of the continuity of its political and aesthetic ideas, the unity of its form and content.
triff: here comes the wholistic autonomist: moral aspects in the work -though relevant- don't need to conflict with its aesthetic role. I can say that "Hitler is wonderfully portrayed," or "the rape scene in Irréversible is very compelling," precisely because its depiction of human depravity. the autonomist is ready to admit (sith the moralist) that literary works of authors like Dostoevsky and Shakespeare, convey important moral insights.
here comes the cognitive ethicist argument: works of art teach us moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. To make this cognitivist argument work it is not enough to show that art can educate us morally. One also has to show that its capacity to teach us is an aesthetic merit in it.
An art work can teach us a great deal about the world without this having anything to do with its artistic merit: photographs of Victorian Britain are an important source of information about that society, but that does not make them better as art works. As noted in the first section, a work is intrinsically ethically flawed just in case it manifests ethically reprehensible attitudes.
When works manifest attitudes, they do so by prescribing or inviting their audiences to have certain responses: de Sade’s Juliette manifests its sadistic attitudes by inviting readers to have erotic responses towards the scenes of sexual torture it depicts. Responses which works prescribe are not always merited: for instance, a horror film invites us to be horrified by the events it recounts, but if those events are ineptly presented, they may merit amusement, not horror.
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