how to present the final exam

Phi 2604 Critical Thinking and Ethics
Doe, John
Final Exam

Times New Roman p. 12
double spaced answers.
just the answers, not the questions.

Final Exam chapter 27

1- Peter Singer is talking about Bengal, which he calls "the present situation," but that was in 1972. Can you think of a place in the world right now that fits that "emergency" profile? Which? If so, what (following Singer) would that prove?
2- What is Singer's thesis in chapter 27 regarding affluence and famine?
3- Singer writes: "... if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally to do it." What does he mean? Do you agree or disagree, explain your answer.
4- Singer says the following: "... If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality or whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us (or we are away from him)." What is he driving at?
5- Singer makes an argument on p. 248 for giving more than $5 to the Bengal Relief Fund. What is it? Do you agree? Why?
6- What does "supererogatory" mean? On p. 251 Singer talks about "common distinction between duty and supererogation." What does he mean?
7- Are you acting immorally by buying a luxury car while others are starving? Justify your answer.
8- Are you acting immorally by paying college tuition for your children while other children have no opportunity for any schooling? Justify your answer.
9- Do you have a moral obligation to try to alleviate extreme poverty in your own country before attempting to do so in other countries? Explain.

final exam, thursday, april 28 at 8:25am

HW, chapter 29

1- What is Walzer's definition for terrorism? p. 266
2- Define the "indirect approach."
3- Is terrorism a "civilian strategy"?
4- The increasing use of terror represents a breakdown of what political code?
5- on p. 268 there are three cases. what is common to all three?
6- On p. 268, Walzer mentions three categories. Go over these.
7- Which people do terrorists try to kill? p. 269
8- Is there a difference between the "Russian Revolutionaries"? the "Stern Gang"? and the IRA? ISIS?
9-Compare these on q. 8 with the NFL's campaign in Viet-Nam
Explain Walzer's distinction of "targets" on p. 271.

homework #7, chapter 7

questions are based on this chapter 7 from the text. 

1. define the following:
a) right, b) entitlement, c) claims, d) duties, e) responsabilities,
2. what is a negative right? give examples.
3. what is a positive right? same as above.
4. As per classification of rights define: a) absolute rights, b) prima facie rights, c) scalar rights,

More interpretive questions,

5- do you agree with Gregory Vlastos (page 199), that all rights are prima facie rights? (think of scalar rights to inform your question)
6- do you agree that there are absolute rights?
7- since legal rights and moral rights are different is one more "inherent" than the other?
8- how do you justify someone having a "natural" right to freedom? (think of your own freedom) 
9- some people, ideologies and governments believe that rights are not inherent, but given. do you agree or disagree and if so, explain.
10- you think animals deserve rights? (if so, should you kill them?)
read this link about euthanasia
11- is involuntary euthanasia moral?
12- do you believe there's something called "dying with dignity"?
for question 12 read this (scroll to "who is at risk for suicide")

HW, Chapter 30

1- what's mcpherson´s definition of terrorism?
2- on p. 276 mcpherson makes a point about war deaths and combatants vs. non-combatants. why?
3- then he cits article 51 of the geneva conventions to address what he calls "proportionality principle" and offers two reasons. comment these.
4- what's mcpherson's conclusion regarding the "proportionality principle"?
5- is there a difference between nelson mandela's terrorist activist and the terrorism defended by ISIS? explain your answer.
6- what's mandela's justification of terrorism? do you agree?
7- read mcpherson's last paragraph on p. 279. do you agree? explain your answer.

Exam #2 (Chapter 37)

Bring this test, printed, headed (top, left hand-side) Times New Roman, p. 12,

Heading:

Phi 2604, Test #2
T,R 8:25am
Doe, John

____________________________________

1- What is the main argument of Tom Regan's "The Case for Animal Rigthts"?
2- Mary Anne Warren disagrees with Regan. Why?

person_p= a being with 1. reason, 2. sentience, 3. autonomy, 4. free will?

3- what is the "weak animal rights" position?
4- Mary Anne Warren takes Regan's argument into three stages: mention each one.
5- Take this of the best known animal rights defender utilitarian Peter Singer:

In "Animal Liberation," Singer argues that in assessing the consequences of our actions, it is necessary to take the interests of animals seriously and to weigh any adverse affect on those interests from human actions as part of the consequences of those actions. Humans have failed to do this, Singer argues, because of a species bias, or speciesism, that results in a systematic devaluation of animal interests. Singer claims that speciesism is no more morally defensible than racism, sexism, or other forms of discrimination that arbitrarily exclude humans from the scope of moral concern.

Do you agree with Singer that our treatment of animals shows this kind of species bias? If so, provide one example.

6- What does "inherent value" mean?
7- How does a "perfectionist theory" is adumbrated into the "inherent value" argument according to Regan?
8- What is the "respect principle"?
9- From Regan's perspective, do the trees in a forest have inherent values? why?
10- Do you see a difference between "value" and "right"? Explain.
11- Do you agree with Mary Anne Warren argument in p. 348 of how much is enough?
12- What is Regan's answer to the objection of how far down the biological ladder should we go in granting rights?
13- Do you take the following quote by Mary Ann Warren as a defense of animal rights? If so, what kind?

The weak animal rights position seems an unstable compromise between the bold claim that animals have the same basic moral rights that we do and the common view that animals have no rights at all.

14- Then on p. 352, Mary Ann Warren declares this:

The most plausible alternative to the view that animals have moral rights is that although they do not have rights, we are, however obligated not to be cruel to them.  

 Is she definitely defending this position as a substitute to Regan's? If think not, what is she saying?

HW (Chapter 39)

1. According to Sober, environmentalists have a problem. What is it? 

2. "Widening the ethical circle" according to Sober means including less organisms whose costs and benefits we compare.

3. Is Sober making an argument that species have mental states?

4.  Does he believe that every species is crucial to a balanced eco-system?

5. Does Sober believes that each extinction matters only "a little?"

6. Do you think that Sober takes the environmentalists to be using the slippery slope argument?

7. According to Sober, do environmentalists and animal liberationists differ with respect to wild and domesticated animals?

8. Do environmentalists favor domesticated animals?

9.  Do you think that if a whale is listed as "in danger of extinction" it should count more than another which is not? If so why?

10. What is a slippery slope argument?

11. Do you find any relevant differences between aesthetic and environmental values?

homework, chapter 6 (ethics of duty, part 2)

Dear class: Let's go back to some points in Formalism, now that I have added W.D. Ross's revision of Kant. (Go to page 187. Kantian Heritage).

1. how is acting from duty exemplary?
2. why should morality be impartial?
3. why is respecting others important?
4. why did Kant miss the importance of human inclinations?
5. Kant excluded emotions from his formalism. Why? How could emotions be included wothout betraying our notions of duty?

from my W.D. Ross' post:
1. according to W D Ross, what's the difference between a prima facie duty and an actual duty?
use the example I provided. keeping a promise to A endangers the life of B.   
2. what's my prima facie duty?, what's my actual duty?
3. is "breaking my promise" my actual duty?
4. Ross really doesn't provide a duty hierarchy, yet, "self-improvement" is not at the top of his duties. why?
5. think of a situation where self-improvement becomes a higher ranked duty.

from my self-respect post:
1. explain why dignity is "absolute inner worth" according to Kant?
2. why is dignity intrinsic?
3. Discuss how Paul Dodhson connects time, sex, relations and drugs, with the idea of dignity.

Some ideas about self-respect

DIGNITY IS AN END

self-respect yields the idea of self-worth or human dignity. as autonomous moral agents, we are ends in themselves with the "absolute inner worth" that Kant calls "dignity" (Würde).

Dignity is not a worth that others can give to you, or one has to earn or waive or give up. If you are a person you have DIGNITY, regardless of personal qualities, social status, and accomplishments and failures.

Dignity is intrinsic worth: we all have dignity simply in virtue of having been born with the rational capacities that make us persons. Persons are all equal in dignity, and this gives each person both the moral status of an equal person among persons and an equal set of basic rights, at least some of which are inviolable and inalienable.

now, let's address self respect by applying Kant's second formulation to oneself:

treat yourself as an END never MERELY as a means to an end (taken from Paul Dodsohn A Personal Guide For the Honest)

imagine these: 1. Wasted time, 2. Bad sex, 3. Drugs, 4. Bad companies.  

let's tackle those:

1. Wasted time: time flies. because of its temporal importance, time is the reserve of one's life. I must save my time to become as productive as I possibly can. 

Wasting time is WASTING LIFE. Wasting life is being self-destructive.  

2. Bad sex: clearly, sex is more than sexual pleasure. sex is a vehicle for meaningful relationships -as with romantic love. but there's bad sex when sex turns against one's dignity and self-growth. 

Bad sex leaves us regretful, empty, and emotionally scarred. 

3. Drugs: A drug habit undermines one's dignity by making the person dependent on their worst possible traits. 

Since "under the influence" one is not fully oneself, drugs may make us do regrettable things.  

4. Bad companies: these are bad relations that impede one's flourishing. they waste one's time because very little comes out of it. one shouldn't be friends with people who are disrespectful to themselves or others. 

With bad friends I end up doing what I ought to stop myself from doing.

HW (chapter 25)

1- What's the difference between "active" and "passive" euthanasia?
2- Rachels analyzes the cases of children which Down's syndrome are allowed to die in cases of intestinal obstruction. She then gives an example of Smith's inheritance (p. 229). She asks: Did either men behave better from a moral point of view?  Do you have a counter to Rachels's point on behalf of doctors?
3- Under what circumstances is active euthanasia morally preferable to passive euthanasia?

chapter 35, READING, HIGH VS. LOW

Gans strikes me as a cultural relativist disguised as a perspectivist. why?
he attributes these differences between high and low to "taste." and the taste is given -he would say- by intersubjective norms, but he doesn't press further that the a work is better because notes in the work that elicit notes which become a norm.

in the end we get an "elite" taste and a "commons" taste. the point is that given any subset of "low" you can find we always get a niche of experts, i.e, we get "elites" in each sub common category. but i'm ahead of myself.

in the middle of all this is the history of high/low, which goes back to 18th century. it's a modern thing. then there is cultural evolution: early 20th century, movies were "low" when compared to theater, now it reigns. rock music was attacked by establishment and many jazz players (rock was a competition to earlier swing music from jazz bands, note: charlie parker hated it because it lacked the harmonic complexity of jazz).

... popular art is dominated by a need for familiar forms, an intolerance of ambiguity, a tendency toward easiness and indulgence in stimulated emotion. In spite of all this he thinks there “is a time and place even for popular art. 

who doubts that mcdonald's whooper sandwhich is a masterpiece? 

Novitz defends a form of conventionalism which makes high a product of the elites. but that ignores that opera was popular when it came out (there was opera a opera buffa or comic). jazz was quite popular when it came up in new orleans in the 1920s. now it's a classical form, the chinese and venezuelans take classical music to new hights in their youth symphony orchestras.

Carroll (1998) seems to defend a sort of objectivist position. he argues that the key theoretical concept is not that of popular art but of "mass art" that is to say, art that is mass-produced and distributed in multiple quantities as a species of popular art, which he defines as the art of the commons. what makes this possible?

the commons? or the media? (many argue with the advent of social media that it's both)

1. massification. to appeal the mass work must gravitate "toward the lowest level of taste, sensitivity, and intelligence".
2. passivity. genuine art should require active spectatorship, yet mass art abets passive reception. it's easy and safe.
3. formulaic. a common complaint is that popular or mass art is formulaic,whereas real art is original in its conception and in its goals.

this has three points:

1. multiples
2. produced and distributed by a mass technology
3. intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural choices (for example, its narrative forms, symbolism, intended affect, and even its content) toward those choices that promise accessibility with minimum effort. . . for the largest number of untutored (or relatively untutored) audiences."

since Carroll bites the bullet, we should think through his points: 

point 1. lowest means saleable. that's definitely a concern of producers today. 2. passivity? how does one define that? techno is repetitive. but so is minimalism in contemporary music. how is mass music being distributed in the radio more "passive" than a more challenging music form? 3. formulaic. definitely! main stream reggeton is a good example.

homework #6, chapter 6

this homework is based on our textbook, chapter 6,

and my two lectures: on this lecture and this lecture.

1. Why is keeping a promise a duty? In your defense, bring to bear Kant's first formulation. 

2. Do you have duties to yourself? Explain why.   

3. What does it mean to say that an action is universal and reversible? 

4. What's Kant's idea of respect? Bring an example from your own life to apply this idea.

5. Explain the difference between treating a person "as a mean to," and "merely as a mean to and end"?

6. How do you apply the second principle to yourself? Explain.

Questions stressed in yellow require at least 30 words.

HW 9 (chapter 43)

This chapter explores the idea of consensual sex on campus

Be aware of each of the three stories of Joan (p. 410-411).

1- In light of freedoms of adult students and teachers to pursue their relationships, is there a possibility of a policy limiting sexual relationships on campus?
2- Do you agree with Wesley College's policy that sexual relationships constitute "an intolerable invasion of
privacy?" If yes or no, why?

We need the following definitions:
Paternalism: A policy or practice of treating or governing people in a fatherly manner, especially by providing for their needs without giving them rights or responsibilities.
Conflict of interests: the circumstance of a public officeholder, corporate officer, etc., whose personal interests might benefit from his or her official actions or influence.
Autonomy: The condition or quality of being autonomous; independence.

3- Explain the paternalist position concerning sexual relationships (p. 413).
4- Do you agree that the paternalist view affects women unequally? If so, why? (keep in mind that right now there are more male professors than female professors in our universities and colleges).
5- What would a more permissive policy regarding sexual relationships on campus may look like? Elaborate.
6- Let's go over the different problems of consensual relationship on campus (p. 414)
7- What is the most likely conflict of interests at universities? Give examples. (p. 414)
8-  What is impaired consent? (hint: a "yes doesn't mean a "yes") Explain.
9-  Define "informed consent"?

HW 8 (chapter 35)

Let's start this second text with an analysis that is often postponed or not addressed at all. the issue of Animal Rights on Chapter 35. 

1- What are the animal goals that philosopher Tom Regan is committed to at the beginning of the essay?
2- In the second paragraph we get a look at a second possible position which is still sympathetic to animals, though Tom Regan would not support it. make a hypothetical list of that second less radical position?
3- What is Regan's "fundamental wrong"?
4- Regarding animals, what's an "indirect duty"? in the dog example, what is Regan trying to show? p. 328
5-  Contractarianism is the view of a social contract between parties that agree to a set of rules which maximize their interests. The result for ethics is that moral actions follow the rule, immoral actions disobey the rule. 
Explain why Regan doesn't think Contractarianism makes sense in the case of animal rights.
7- Is Contractarianism an indirect view of justice according to Regan?
8- Comment the "cruelty/kindness view." Why is it no better according to Regan?  p.330
9- Explain this sentence: "What has value for the utilitarian is the satisfaction of an individual's interests, not the individual whose interests they are." . 332
10- Define Speciesism? p. 331
11- Do you agree with Regan's example of Aunt Bea?
12- What does it mean being "the subject of a life?
13- Do you believe that animals have inherent value? If not, why not?
14- If you answer to 13 is "No," are you then a speciesist?
15- Do you agree with this?

Some believe animals have less inherent value than we have. What is the reason? Lack of reason, intellect? Only if we're willing to make the same judgment in the case of humans that are similarly deficient. 

homework chapter 3

1. what do we call a religion?
2. mention the main features of a religion.
3. what did religions provide early societies with?
4. did religions spur civilizations? how?
5. what is fideism?
6. define the conflict model, the compatibilist and the incompatibilist model,
7. what's the divine command theory?
8. can religion be liberating? (think of the civil rights movement in the 1960s)

faith vs. reason

the basic problem of faith and reason in religion comes from the tension between the spiritual realm and the physical realm.

the spiritual realm involves supernatural facts, ecstasy, divine revelation, sacred pronouncements, which are immune from rational critique and evaluation. see that the spiritual realm consistently appears in all cultures. 

i said in class that fighting the spiritual realm with rational arguments is a category mistake.

that doesn't mean that we should avoid rational examination of our beliefs. the key philosophical issue regarding the problem of faith and reason is to work out how the authority of faith and the authority of reason. here are some ways to cut the cake:

fideism: faith is a kind of super-belief that doesn't need physical proof. st. paul has a great definition: "... faith is the assurance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen." given this definition, the fideist doesn't need physical evidence.

there are three approaches: 

1. conflict model: faith and reason are incompatible because they claim different things.
2. incompatibilist model: faith and reason are different. reason aims at empirical truth; faith deals with spiritual truths. so, there's no rivalry.
3. compatibilist model: faith and reason have a connection. compatibilism entertains a rational explanation for the existence of god, such as st. anselm's ontological argument, or thomas aquinas's prime mover, etc.

anthropological/evolutionary argument for religion

intro

1. Religion today is a common denominator in world politics (Islam, Christianity, Hinduism) which is why it is all the more important to understand it correctly.

 2. People confuse religion with the easy stereotype of ignorant people that believe the world was created in seven days and Adam and Eve. In other words, they confuse the whole of religion with "religious narratives." 

3. A misconception is to blame religion for the ills of the world. A silly as blaming the world itself for world history. It's US HUMANS who benefit from religion, otherwise it would not exist.

4. Another misconception is that religion is "oppressive," but what is exactly oppressive about? If religion is a cultural product, then it has to come with all the goods and evils of culture.

click here for theories of religion,

we need to understand why religions perdure after 150,000 years of human existence and still provide important social cohesion.

present facts:

there are 2.2 billion christians (32% of the world’s population), 1.6 billion muslims (23%), 1 billion Hindus (15%), 500 million buddhists (7%), 14 million jews and an estimated 58 million practicing others faiths like, jainism, sikhism, taoism, etc,

1. religions are cultural systems of beliefs behaviors and practices: they include moral rules, holy narratives, holy texts, holy places, holy martyrs, all of which relate to supernatural, transcendental and spiritual beliefs and practices, worldviews, prophecies, codified morals and devout human groups dealing with godly, the supernatural, the transcendental, the spiritual REALM.
religions exhibit the following: 

a) cosmology, the PAST (creation of the universe), the NOW and the FUTURE (teleology),
b) rituals include worship, commemorations, sacrifices, festivals, feasts, trances, initiations, funerary services, matrimonial services, meditation, prayer, worship, holy music, holy art, devout public service, etc.
c) canonic texts, (bible, koran, upanishads, baghavad gita, etc)
d) prophets (Christ, Buddha, Mohamed, Confucius, Zarathustra),

2. religions provide viable symbols, which explain the origin and the meaning of life, the universe, human finitude, and our purpose on this earth,

what would we be without the richness of our cultures' symbols? 

evolution

3. religions' origins hark back to paleolithic and neolithic rituals with the dead (keep in mind that non-human animals display only a casual interest in the dead).

why did homo sapiens developed specific behaviors toward the dead? for sure not out of  a mushroom induced orgiastic ritual.

 why do we as humans need the afterlife?  because human life is not enough to explain the finitude of human life.  

4. quite early, homo sapiens develop specific religious symbols across cultures. how? homo sapiens anchored supernatural entities through representational art and rituals. once they are translated into material form, supernatural concepts become easier to communicate and understand.

moral precepts are simply explained, what's right is right because God commands it!

this is a didactic feat of social and moral evolution! the simplicity and effectiveness of religions absorbing moral behaviors cannot be underestimated from the anthropological standpoint.

5. then about 10,000 years ago, religion becomes a civilizing engine, by establishing theocracies with defined priesthood classes, along with kings and emperors.

virtually all state societies from around the world have founded political power through divine authority.  in spite of all the noise, secularism cannot properly succeed without a amicable relationship with religion (the quintessential example is the forced secularization of the soviet union under communism in the 20th century. it didn't work).    

exam #2 (chapters 27, 29, 30)

criticism (chapter 27)

legislative criticism: treats artistic AW as something up for refined discrimination and a self-conscious education in taste. Basically it tells you what, it speaks with conviction and assuredness.

There is a difference between critique and review. in the second you make descriptive comments about it and withhold evaluation. in the first you evaluate.

appreciative description: In appreciative description the critic functions as an intermediary between the work and the audience. The critic is presumed to have better taste, greater sensitivity to meaning, and more extensive relevant knowledge than the audience. The critic simultaneously evaluates and describes.

analytic criticism: you take the work and basically deconstruct it. you need to be informed of the latest theories. the advantage is analysis, the disadvantage is it tends to disconnect with readers.

interpretive criticism: The interpretive criticism that produces significance is usually directed to canonical works, and it serves a function similar to that of the re-staging of dramatic works.

cultural criticism: This notion of criticism comes from Karl Marx and Matthew Arnold. The idea is to put the AW's ideas into a cultural or socio-political context.

art & expression (chapter 30)

classical expression theory: Art is an expressive human activity (bu means of signs, feelings, experiences). For example, the artist expresses "sadness" to the audience by causing the work to possess or express sadness.

semantic theory: (defended by Nelson Goodman). It attempts to explain the central features of art within a theory of symbols. A expresses E, according to Goodman, if
1. A possesses E metaphorically, and
2. if A exemplifies E.

Example: If Guernica expresses horror, then the painting must express horror metaphorically by exemplifying it.

flavor vs. emotion: it's based on evoltution. there are 1. primary reinforcers: pheromones, (odors such as ripe fruit, and the smell of rotting food). 2. inter-species odors: odors of individuals may be pleasant because of major histo-compatibility complex genes, (e.g. same tribe, cultural region, etc). people smell like the foods they use. which specify olfactory receptors that signal reward produced be the smell of another individual with different immune system.
examples: a) homo S detecting individuals with a different immune system may have more diverse immune systems, and thereby greater resistance to disease. b) the odor of the cheese brie may be initially unpleasant, but may become pleasant after learned association with its taste and fatty texture (fatty texture is a primary reinforcer because of a high-energy value food).

art and morals (chapter 29)

aestheticism (autonomism): holds that ethical assessment is irrelevant to aesthetic assessment.  

An extreme version of autonomism is that it makes no sense morally to evaluate works of art, in the same way that it makes no sense for instance morally to evaluate numbers.

wholistic autonomism: moral aspects in the work -though relevant- don't need to conflict with its aesthetic role. I can say that "Hitler is wonderfully portrayed," or "the rape scene in Irréversible is very compelling," precisely because its depiction of human depravity. the autonomist is ready to admit (sith the moralist) that literary works of authors like Dostoevsky and Shakespeare, convey important moral insights.

immoralism: holds that works of art may be aesthetically good because of their ethical flaws. Although ethics and aesthetics are normative disciplines, they very different in scope. aesthetics evaluates beautiful non-beautiful, ethics evaluates right, wrong, Extreme immoralism: holds that the only aesthetic merits of a work of art are its ethical flaws. If so, Marquis de Sade one of the greatest writers of all time, and George Eliot one of the worst. Extreme immoralism is clearly weak.

moralism (or ethicism): in contrast holds that works of art are aesthetically bad because of their ethical flaws.

Jokes as a genre are at best analogous to works of art. Here the immoralist and the autonomist could agree but for different reasons: The autonomist would maintain that jokes are not in the moral sphere. It's an AS IF... without having to say that it's aesthetically good, precisely because it offends, which seems bizarre. on the other hand one has to agree that in the particular case of comedy (and humor in general) is an aesthetically relevant feature because it is offensive. the immoralist would say the more offensive, the better.

here comes the cognitive ethicist argument: works of art teach us moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. To make this cognitivist argument work it is not enough to show that art can educate us morally. One also has to show that its capacity to teach us is an aesthetic merit in it.

ART AND ETHICS, reading chapter 29

Intro

The relation of art to ethics has been at the forefront of several recent controversies about art.

Consider the following: 

1. the protests over the sexism and violence seemingly advocated in the music of ‘gangsta’ rappers such as Ice-T; 

2. the controversy over the violence of many Hollywood movies, such as Natural Born Killers; 

3. the fatwa declared against Salman Rushdie for publishing The Satanic Verses. 

Art has the power to disturb, power to pummel against the bulwarks of our ethical convictions. 

are the ethical flaws (or merits) of works of art also aesthetic flaws (or merits) in them? 

Consider Leni Riefenstahl’s famous film, Triumph of the Will, which is a glowingly enthusiastic account of the 1934 Nuremberg Nazi Party rally. Is the film aesthetically flawed because of its advocacy of Hitler’s cause? It has frequently been denounced as bad art because of its message. Or is its immoral stance simply an irrelevance to its merit as a work of art? So we have three positions:

_________

Aestheticism (autonomism) holds that ethical assessment is irrelevant to aesthetic assessment.

Immoralism holds that works of art may be aesthetically good because of their ethical flaws. 

Moralism (or ethicism) in contrast holds that works of art are aesthetically bad because of their ethical flaws.


Autonomists acknowledge that although ethics and aesthetics are normative disciplines, they are very different in scope. Aesthetics evaluates beautiful non-beautiful, ethics evaluates right, wrong,   

Aesthetic works -unlike moral actions- are not "actions" of fundamental consequence for human welfare, (this is granting that artworks could be considered actions). 

How about an art performance. It looks like an "action," but it's a pretending one... the action is not real, moral actions, on the other hand, should be considered real actions. 

First, some works of art are ethically deeply flawed, for instance Triumph of the Will, yet they are good, or even great, works of art. That being so, it might be argued that the ethical cannot be aesthetically relevant. Now, the example certainly proves something: if one held that moral merits are the only kind of aesthetic merits which there are, then one must aesthetically condemn the film.

Gaut takes a different approach, for her the aesthetic attitude is defined in terms of detachment or disengagement from practical concerns, being an attitude of pure contemplation towards the aesthetic object (the idea derives from the Kantian notion of disinterest).

ok, this is partly true. though it's not a requirement that the aesthetic is divorced from emotions -as we have learned with my previous lecture on the flavor emotion connection.  

However, even if one accepted this disputable characterization, it would not follow that moral considerations played no role in aesthetic assessment. I am forced to take a merely contemplative attitude towards historical figures such as Napoleon, since I can do nothing to alter the past, I could still hold moral views about these individuals.

sure, why not. look at this two propositions: 1. "Hitler was a good watercolorist." 2. "Hitler was a mass murderer." 1. and 2. are independent. Let's add one more: 3. "Hitler loved dogs," which is true. 1. 2. and 3. are independent. they address Hitler "notes". not all of Hitler notes are moral notes. 

 Our aesthetic interest is directed not just at lines and colors, but also at how the art work presents a certain subject-matter:the ideas and attitudes it manifests towards its subject. Consider Picasso’s great antiwar painting Guernica. Someone who reacted to it merely as a set of line sand colors in Cubist style would be missing out on a central item of aesthetic interest: namely, how Picasso uses Cubist fragmentation to convey something of the horror of war and Fascism. Our aesthetic interest is directed, in part, at the mode of presentation of subject matter; and the way it is presented can and often does manifest ethical attitudes. This is what aesthetic expert Monroe Beardsley calls "regional properties" (i.e., expressive qualities) Autonomism should be rejected: but that does not yet show that moralism is correct, for one might be an immoralist. 

Triff: why does Gaut say that autonomism be rejected? let me ask the question differently: is moralism better because it brings the two branches together? they do it at the expense of making the aesthetic dependent of the ethical (the aesthetic is flawed when the ethical suffers). the autonomist can despise Hitler the individual, and still appreciate his art. I find this a sophisticated position in its complexity.

Immoralism is a little discussed position; yet it is, in my view, a more interesting and powerful rival to moralism than is autonomism. Extreme immoralism holds that the only aesthetic merits of a work of art are its ethical flaws. If so, Marquis de Sade one of the greatest writers of all time, and George Eliot one of the worst. Extreme immoralism is clearly weak.

In contrast, moderate immoralism holds that the ethical flaws of a work can be aesthetic merits in it. This is compatible with holding that sometimes ethical flaws are aesthetic flaws, and also with holding that there is a plurality of aesthetic values.

see that Gaut prefers moderate immoralism over autonomism. 

This moderate immoralism looks attractive.Why might one be an immoralist? First, art is sometimes praised for its transgressive or subversive qualities; so if art sometimes subverts our moral values, couldn’t it be ipso facto good? This view is defended by Lawrence Hyman. Hyman claims that there is often a tension or conflict between our aesthetic and ethical responses to works: a work’s aesthetic power can act to undermine our moral values, and the moral resistance we feel can enhance the work’s aesthetic worth.

this is a good point in fact, think of evil characters such as King Lear, Macbeth of Richard III in Shakespeare's plays.Let's use the immoralist argument to defend Gaspar Noe's IRRÉVERSIBLE which movie critic Roger Ebert called "unwatchable". Triff's report: I watched it. I cringed, I cowered, I looked the other way (watched with a group of friends). At the end I didn't know what to say. In time, I have reconsidered the movie a valuable aesthetic experience. The movie is good in its deliverance of the chaos of sex, the futility of depravity, the banality of violence, etc. In some sense the movie makes me much better than a didactic film. in defense of the autonomist I can say that the autonomist can love Irreversible because of its aesthetic qualities, BUT BY AESTHETIC I MEAN THE WHOLE THING. perhaps we could call this view wholistic autonomism. it holds that including relevant moral notes enriches our aesthetic evaluation. Ok, I'm ready for a definition now:

wholistic autonomism: an art work's relevant moral notes can enhance aesthetic evaluations.    


Ethically sound works can represent immoral characters and their attitudes without the works sharing those attitudes. But it is the attitudes manifested in a work that are relevant to the dispute between moralists and immoralists.

I don't get it. 

A second argument for immoralism appeals not to transgression but to inseparability. The moralist holds, roughly, that a moral flaw in a work is an aesthetic flaw: so it seems he or she should claim that were the moral flaw removed, this would aesthetically improve the work. But, the objection goes,this is clearly false. is the immoralist making that strong a claim?

If on the other hand immoral attitudes are actually embraced by a work, then we can plausibly deny that this is an aesthetic merit: de Sade’s enthusiastic endorsement of sexual torture and enslavement gives one reason to be revolted, not aesthetically enraptured.

triff: hmm, the autonomist would not disagree with this. if the autonomist is ready to defend the work as a whole with its moral flaws, they should be equally ready to critique on the same grounds. WHY? BECAUSE THE NORMATIVE COMPASS IT NOT MORAL BUT AESTHETIC.    


Pro tanto (for as much as one is able to) principles are indeed general: it is always the case that an act is bad insofar as it is a lie. But it does not follow that improving an act in a particular respect (by telling the truth) would all things considered improve it. For by improving it in this respect, I might remove some other good-making feature it possesses (such as its being kind). So there may be general pro tanto principles, but there need be no all-things-considered principles. And this is because certain properties of actions are interactive.

A third argument for immoralism appeals to offensive jokes: are not certain jokes funny precisely because they are cruel and wounding, and is that not enough to show that moralism is false (Jacobson 1997: 171–2)?

As thus stated, the objection fails: jokes as a genre are at best analogous to works of art, and moralism is a thesis about works of art, not jokes. Here the immoralist and the autonomist could agree but for different reasons: The autonomist would maintain that jokes are not in the moral sphere.
It's an AS IF... without having to say that it's aesthetically good, precisely because it offends, which seems bizarre. on the other hand one has to agree that in the particular case of comedy (and humor in general) is an aesthetically relevant feature because it is offensive.

Drawing on the strategy just noted, we could agree that the revised play would be less good insofar as its humor was lessened, and might also agree that the play would be, all things considered, aesthetically worse. But we could still consistently hold that there vised play would be aesthetically improved insofar as it was no longer vicious. agree. moralism: holds that a work of art is always aesthetically flawed insofar as it possesses an ethical flaw which is aesthetically relevant. The basic argument appeals to the fact that works of art can teach us, and what they can teach us includes moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. Strong versions of the view even hold that only certain great works of literature, such as the novels of Henry James, can teach us very fine-grained moral truths (Nussbaum 1990).

The moralist holds that a moral flaw in a work is an aesthetic flaw: so it seems he or she should claim that were the moral flaw removed, this would aesthetically improve the work. But, the objection goes,this is clearly false. Some aesthetically good features of a work may depend on its moral flaws: for instance, Riefenstahl’s film is great not just because of the formal beauty of its images, but because of the continuity of its political and aesthetic ideas, the unity of its form and content.

triff: here comes the wholistic autonomist: moral aspects in the work -though relevant- don't need to conflict with its aesthetic role. I can say that "Hitler is wonderfully portrayed," or "the rape scene in Irréversible is very compelling," precisely because its depiction of human depravity. the autonomist is ready to admit (sith the moralist) that literary works of authors like Dostoevsky and Shakespeare, convey important moral insights.

here comes the cognitive ethicist argument: works of art teach us moral truths and how we ought morally to feel. To make this cognitivist argument work it is not enough to show that art can educate us morally. One also has to show that its capacity to teach us is an aesthetic merit in it.

An art work can teach us a great deal about the world without this having anything to do with its artistic merit: photographs of Victorian Britain are an important source of information about that society, but that does not make them better as art works. As noted in the first section, a work is intrinsically ethically flawed just in case it manifests ethically reprehensible attitudes.

When works manifest attitudes, they do so by prescribing or inviting their audiences to have certain responses: de Sade’s Juliette manifests its sadistic attitudes by inviting readers to have erotic responses towards the scenes of sexual torture it depicts. Responses which works prescribe are not always merited: for instance, a horror film invites us to be horrified by the events it recounts, but if those events are ineptly presented, they may merit amusement, not horror.

HW 7: justifying ethical claims p. 133-140

let's read the study case in p. 133  "hunter acquitted of manslaughter charge"

1. why did the jurors voted "not guilty" rogerson?
2. explain why they voted this way p. 134.
3. p. 135 offers a different picture. this is called a counter argument. do you find this necessary?
4. what is there about "good reasons" in this case that makes this counter argument compelling?
5. why is it that justification should not be culture-bound?
6. why is it that conflicting ethical claims cannot both be justified?

phi 2604 test #2, topics for review (chapters 4 & 5)

1. Difference between consequentialist theories and Formalist theories.

Consequentialism is the theory that judges the rightness or wrongness of an action in terms of its consequences. Formalism is the theory that judges the rightness or wrongness of an action in terms of the action's form (i.e., "killing is wrong": the formalist believes that moral actions are objective).

 2. Intrinsic value (value for its own sake; personhood is an essential value: a-reason, b-autonomy, c-sentience, d-freedom) and instrumental values (value for the sake of something else).

3. Psychological egoism: everyone always acts solely out of self-interest. This is an interesting claim because it entails that altruistic behavior (behavior done solely for the sake of the other person) does not exist. Even when someone like Mother Teresa appears to be acting for the sake of other people, in actuality she is doing what she does because—according to the psychological egoist—it makes her feel better. 

4. Ethical egoism: What makes an action right is that it promotes one's best interest. This is equivalent to a calculus of prudence. C/A Moral agents are mot mere instruments for one's interest. (b) some claim that ethical egoism is not really an ethical theory. Whatever disagreements may exist among ethicists, one thing that most of them agree on is that morality is about overcoming our immediate calculations and caring for the well-being of other people for their own sake.

Click here for my notes on ethical egoism,

5. Act Utilitarianism (or Traditional utilitarianism): What makes an action right is that it maximizes happiness everyone considered (remember this is only a particular milieu: family, class, Miami, Florida, the USA).

Click here for my notes to utilitarianism, 

Rule utilitarianism: what makes an action right is that it falls under a rule which if followed would maximize happiness, everyone considered.

Rule utilitarianism seems to solve some of the problems presented by traditional utilitarianism. 

TAKE A LOOK AT THE GLOSSARY ON PAGES 363- 366 

ART EXPRESSION AND EMOTION chapter 30 reading

classical expression theory

A poem can express sadness without representing a sad state of affairs. More obviously, to take a medium that is not representational, a piece of music can be sad. What we need is some way of making sense of these uses of the emotion terms.

Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that other people are infected by these feelings and also experience them.-- L. Tolstoi. 
the classic expression theory: the artist expresses "sadness" to the audience by causing the work to possess P (P causes sadness).

counter: a problem is that for this to be true P must be the vehicle for the artist’s expression. How is this to be explained?

the point is that if F causes P, F &P must be logically independent, otherwise they fall victim to the genetic fallacy. ex. if "my moving" is caused by your "ordering me to move," you can see that "ordering to move" and "my moving" are not logically connected in the same manner than "all triangles have 3 sides". 

sircello argues that in virtue of their artistic acts and of the similarity they bear to common kinds of expressions, works of art may serve as expressions of those feelings, emotions, attitudes, moods and/or personal characteristic. so, to see a smile is not to see an appearance and infer a happy state of mind, but to see the happy state of mind in the face itself. The ‘act’ and the ‘thing’ are inseparable.  

well known aesthetician Richard Wollheim defends this view as such: Human beings have the capacity to ‘project’ their internal states on to natural objects, a capacity that is rooted deep in our psychology. The objects on to which we project state F (for example) are those which ‘correspond’ to F. A rocky landscape with a solitary tree, for instance, might correspond to melancholy. 

The semantic theory

defended by Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art (1976). It attempts to explain the central features of art within a theory of symbols. A expresses E, according to Goodman, 1. A possesses E metaphorically, and 2. if A exemplifies E.

For A to possess E metaphorically, is for A to fall within the extension of E used as a metaphor. For example, a picture may possess ‘square’ literally, and ‘sad’ metaphorically. An object exemplifies a predicate or property if it refers to it. 

Exemplification is possession plus reference. Hence, our picture not only is sad, it exemplifies sadness. For Goodman a term with an extension established by habit is applied elsewhere under the influence of that habit; there is both a departure from and deference to precedent. 

this is a little bit of appealing to prior consensus.


what is it about the picture that justifies the application of "sad" to it, albeit metaphorically?  metaphorical possession of a property IS NOT not as a linguistic fact, but as a way an object might possess a property.

so, for example, does Guernica by Picasso "posses" the property of horror?

does Guernica refers to "horror"?

the local quality theory

expression is to be analyzed in terms of expressive qualities which are recognized in works of art. such qualities can be analyzed independently of the state of mind of their creator. 

the predicate needs to pick out a property of the work of art that is sufficiently akin to the natural expression of emotion to avoid the ambiguity. A popular candidate in the literature is resemblance between the purely musical properties (in particular, movement) and the natural expression of emotion. 1. a person or object can present the appearance of sadness without actually being sad.  2. resemblance is a property of the music and presumably can be experienced as such.

is this melody sad? (it's in a minor key, we talked about this). does it have the property?
do you think the creator didn't think of sadness?

homework #5, utilitarianism

1. What is consequentialism?

2. What is traditional utilitarianism? Does it make sense in the case of the trolley experiment? Explain why.

3. What is the problem with distributing utility?

4. Do you agree with Brandt's Utilitarian Heir counterexample? Explain why.

5. What's rule utilitarianism? How would a rule utilitarian respond to Brandt's Utilitarian Heir counterexample? Explain.

6. Are utilitarians allowed to give any special weight to consequences that would afflict them personally when happiness to the majority is at stake? 

7. Which theory do you feel more drawn to, Egoism or Utilitarianism? Explain why.

CRITICISM, reading chapter 27

Legislative criticism: treats artistic AW as something up for refined discrimination and a self-conscious education in taste.

Basically it tells you what, it speaks with conviction and assuredness. NOT A PROBLEM GIVEN THESE DAYS OF DUMB DOWN VALUES. 

A bit later, the romantic shift of power from critic or theorist to the artist elicited the need for the interpretation of works of genius, and so the critic now was not so much a judge of quality as a guide to the significance of works of art.

These changes meant that critics became reviewers, reappraisers,and interpreters rather than legislative theorists, although the earlier role lingered on in the imperiously judgemental tone that much early reviewing took.

there is a difference between critique and review. in the second you make descriptive comments about it and withhold evaluation. in the first you evaluate. CALL A SPADE A SPADE, IF YOU'RE WRONG YOU'RE WRONG. AS SIMPLE AS THAT. 

Appreciative description: In appreciative description the critic functions as an intermediary between the work and the audience. The critic is presumed to have better taste, greater sensitivity to meaning, and more extensive relevant knowledge than the audience.

isn't that what one wants from the critic? to get x-tra valuable info?

... we are never absolutely sure we have correctly identified a WA, and, therefore, the rock critic reviewing his favorite band is, in principle, in the same position as the art historian commenting on Greek vases: they must both identify the AW, which gives them the relevant criteria for description and appraisal. In practice, however, the difference between intimacy and remoteness is crucial. If the rock critic had to explain his view to someone unfamiliar with the tradition and current bands, he would be giving a course not writing a review.

when going back, WEAR THE RIGHT GLASSES!

Such criticism can, however, have the paradoxical effect of making the work more distant experientially, even though it may be better understood.

so what, distant is only because it's not understood. if something is understood it's already NEAR. 

The next and most important stage in the critical journey is reached when critics are on intimate terms with performances and can presume that audiences share the relevant contexts.

SURE,

Such criticism does not consist of arguments in support of verdicts, but of efforts of the critic to express through appreciative description the basis upon which a work is judged. Appreciative description is “discourse grounding evaluation,” and evaluation is implicit in the description itself.

this is cool. when the critic finds a word that simultaneously describes and evaluates.

coreggio, the mystical marriage of st. catherine

this is what Nicolas Penny writes:

In the center of the most beautiful painting by Correggio in the Louvre there is a knot of flesh as intricate and lively as a swimming octopus. It consists of the left hand of the Virgin Mary delicately supporting the slightly smaller right hand of Saint Catherine, while the much smaller hand of the infant Christ tenderly picks out the Saint’s ring finger. This is a miniature example of an effect at which Correggio excelled: actions inspired by a sentiment of breathless intensity are somehow endowed with angelic grace and with a formal complexity which is delightfully difficult to disentangle.  

Analytic criticism: Analytic criticism is closely tied to a formalist theory of the arts that takes the underlying organization of works of art as their distinctive value,thus subordinating the mimetic and expressive appearances that are dominant in descriptive criticism. Formal analysis, of which New Criticism is perhaps the best-known school, claims that it can analyze out and reveal the very structure or principle of formal organization in AW.

you take the work and basically deconstruct it. the advantage is analysis, the disadvantage is it tends to disconnect with readers.

Interpretive criticism: The interpretive criticism that produces significance is usually directed to canonical works, and it serves a function similar to that of the re-staging of dramatic works. Both provide continuity not by historical reconstruction, which takes us backward in time, but through the making of meanings that bring them forward to us. For example, this one by Simone Weil:

The true hero, the true subject, the center of the Iliad is force. Force employed by man, force that enslaves man, force before which man shrinks away....The cold brutality of the deeds of war is left undisguised; neither victors nor vanquished are admired, scorned, or hated. . .. As for the warriors, victors or vanquished, those comparisons which liken them to beasts or things can inspire neither admiration nor contempt, but only regret that men are capable of being so transformed.

problem here is interpretation itself, 

Cultural criticism: This notion of criticism comes from Marx’s ‘critical criticism’ and Matthew Arnold in “The Study of Criticism at the Present Time,” where he contrasts it to “polemical practical criticism.” Criticism has here almost wholly lost its meaning as discourse grounding the evaluation of performances, and instead uses commentary on art and culture as a basis for social criticism.

what you do is take the AW and put it in a socio-political context and talk about it from that angle. it helps to see it in context, but as you move out of the AW one looses detail. 

Review (First Exam)

Opinion: A belief or conclusion held with confidence but not substantiated by positive knowledge or proof.

Belief: A mental state of acceptance.

Subjectivism: The truth of moral judgments is dependent upon people's beliefs.

Objectivism: The truth of moral judgments is independent of people's beliefs.

Relativism: Truth is relative to point of view (subjectivism), culture (cultural relativism).

Moral relativism: same as above, but now concerning moral judgments. So, moral judgments are not true independent of people's point of view or culture.

Justification: something, such as facts or reasons given to hold a belief.

Grounds for justification: In Ethics it means the elimination of bias, of subjective or relative elements.
1. We verify them or falsify them over time.
2. Someone else (regardless of her cultural biases) can verify or falsify the.
3. The justification withstands rational criticism.

Kantian Respect: treat people as ends in themselves, not as means to an end.

The idea of respect is symmetrical: We have an obligation to treat people with respect since we'd like to be treated with respect.

Knowledge: Justified true belief. Ethics involves non-relative claims.

Ethics: The study of moral norms and systems.

Human rights/// Positive Rights: Positive rights usually oblige action, for example: welfare rights. Negative Rights: Negative Rights oblige inaction, for example: private property, freedom of speech, etc.

Culture: The arts, beliefs, customs, institutions, and other products of human work and thought considered as a unit, especially with regard to a particular time or social group. Subculture: A particular group within the more general group.

 Reasons and "good reasons": A reason is a consideration that justifies or explains. Not all reasons given are equally good. Good reasons are those that are generally binding to members across cultures.

 Neutrality: We should consider the claims of all persons as equally biding.

Ethical perspective: ethical empathy means imagining oneself as victim: being stolen to, being cheated, being the victim of discrimination, etc.

Difference between "being ethical" and "being practical" ---> what "we ought to do" vs. what "we'll probably do."

More on rights and respect HERE.

HW 7 (a bit of chapters 2 and 3)

1. examine the two cases on p. 67 and 68. what is your take?
2. what is the difference between being ethical and being "practical"? p. 69, 70
3. why is "knowing what to do" often not enough in these cases?
4. is there is a difference between short-term interests to oneself and duties to oneself? p.70, 71

chapter 4 (The Justification of Ethical Claims)

1. what is the difference between justification and explanation? p. 127
2. what is considered "good reasons" in ethics? p. 128, 129
3. explain the difference between normative and descriptive terms.
4. how do we recognize "poor" or "bad" ethical reasoning? p. 129, 130

ON TASTE Reading Chapter 17 (analysis)

Taste is a term literally employed to refer to one of the five senses, the one that provides gustatory discrimination and enjoyment. As a bodily sense, taste is inevitably linked with pleasure or displeasure; that is to say, it is a sensory response that tends to carry a positive or negative balance. This affective component is one of the features of gustatory taste that lends itself to employment as a metaphor of aesthetic enjoyment, for the object of taste is not only perceived but also liked or disliked.

1- taste needs first-hand experience. this is known as knowledge by acquaintance. Just as one cannot decide that soup is well-seasoned without actually sipping it, so one cannot conclude that music is lyrical and moving without hearing it. 

2-  though aesthetic taste is grounded in natural dispositions, it clearly requires cultivation.

Cultivation doesn't mean elitism. It means having access to the information.

3- taste is a kind of sensibility, although some theorists such as Edmund Burke insisted on the role of understanding in determining appreciation. In any case, taste soon became the chief term employed to explain the perception of beauty. 

All you have to do is surmise that appreciating a painting is a form of tasting it visually. 

4- taste is inter-subjective: one has it, but in addition, one learns about it through exchange of information with others.  

5- judgements of taste are about objects: the statement "X is beautiful" is not just a report that it pleases the speaker, but a debatable claim that refers to qualities in X, that may be noticed and enjoyed by others.

Scottish empiricist David Hume makes central use of the idea that taste in art is developed in ways rather similar to taste for food or drink. To advance his argument he tells an anecdote about two tasters of wine who are ridiculed because they can detect faint traces of metal and leather in a hogshead of wine that no one else can taste. But they are vindicated in the end, because when the cask is drained it is found to contain a key attached to a leather thong, and the discerning tasters are proved to have the most delicate taste.

Hume unknowingly is advancing a realist position in aesthetics, THE FLAVOR OF LEATHER IS IN THE JUICE. Sommeliers do this all the time. remind me to talk about Triff's formula for wine tasting.

Hume talks about the body of sophisticated judges, whose opinions converge over time in agreement what I've called BEST CONSENSUS.

Taste and aesthetic qualities:

These are qualities that can be noticed by anyone with normally functioning senses who is paying sufficient attention. Aesthetic qualities are properties that distinguish an object as worthy of appreciation or criticism, example: delicate, elegant, powerful, profound, stiff, awkward, and so on are examples of aesthetic qualities. They are not easily discerned by all perceivers but rather require the exercise of a certain sensitivity that the tradition labels "taste."

1- aesthetic judgements diverge more than descriptions about non-aesthetic qualities. why? because aesthetic properties depends upon the presence of non-aesthetic properties.

2- aesthetic realism defends the idea that aesthetic qualities are actual properties of objects. Perhaps they are ‘supervenient’ properties dependent upon non-aesthetic properties, such that objects with the very same non-aesthetic properties must have the same aesthetic properties.

3- taste may be considered an ability to discern subtle qualities in objects: in food or drink the person with (fine) taste can notice trace quantities of herbs or other flavors that lie beneath the threshold of detectability for others.

sketches for my lecture on beauty

INTERPRETATION, reading Chapter 21 (analysis)

Intentionalism

aesthetic works, AW's can be (for the purposes of this course many different things: a painting, good wine, an elegant coreography, a string quartet, a song, a delicious chicken broth, a beautiful building, etc.)

Intentionalism in aesthetics is the view that AW's are expressions of the actual intentions of their creators. Interpretations of art works assert that a work expresses this or that actual intention, and are true only in the event that the intention in question is expressed in the work.

YET... we can look for expressions of intention outside the art work or use background information to help generate more plausible hypotheses about the artist’s intention.

First, expressions of intention are not in general, to be identified with interpretations of one’s own behavior. Second, neither the artist’s interpretation of the work, nor his or her expressions or reports of his or her intentions automatically constitute the correct interpretation of the work.
Third, the artist’s interpretation of the work may be no better, and is often worse, than those of others.  
Expressions of intention can be inaccurate, insincere, or if issued before the work is completed, discarded rather than realized. 

In addition, there is no reason to suppose that a poem, or more generally, a work of art, is a direct expression of what is going on in the artist’s life.  Intentionalism unduly restricts the range of acceptable interpretations so that the proper aim of interpretation cannot be realized.

The monism/pluralism issue 

Monism: there is proper aim in aesthetics, interpretation should aim at satisfying this criteria.

Relativism: there are many equally good interpretations of AW,

Pluralism: there may be different interpretations of a AW, but that doesn't mean they are equally good. 

If art interpretation has a plurality of aims, it is quite possible that there are correct or true interpretations of works arrived in pursuit of some of these other aims that do not make statements about the artist’s intention. 

note: the pluralist idea is not interpretive as much as META-interpretive. i.e., when you interpret you are concerned with your own interpretation. the pluralist is not saying that all interpretations are equally good. what the pluralist is saying is that given a thing to be interpreted there are different ways to interpret, different versions.

Meaning

is there meaning in AWs? there are 3 views:

1- meaning is either something the thing has, 2- something one brings to the thing, 3- a combination of 1- and 2- 

if you believe 1- you are an objectivist, 
if 2- you are a subjectivist, 
if 3- you are a realist, 

Meaning and Intentionalism

Conventionalist meaning: AWs' meanings are determined by conventions. For example, the meaning of a literary work is determined by linguistic conventions, literary conventions, and perhaps other cultural conventions. Conventions are inter-subjective and consensus based. 

Hypothetical intentionalism 

Hypothetical intentionalism is not solely after what the actual artist actually intended, but with what an audience should or would understand to be intended, given certain background assumptions.

The innovative aspect of this view is that work meaning is to be identified with the hypothetical intention the audience is most justified in finding in the work.

So, for example, Picasso's Guernica has a meaning given backgrounds assumptions about the work itself. This is basically CONTEXT.

HW 6: Chapter 2, p. 62-66

1- (regarding consequences) explain the difference between short-term and long-term self-interest. how does this distinction may affect ethical decisions? p. 62

2-  (regarding neutrality) is neutrality desirable in ethical considerations? if so, why? p. 64

3- (empathy) in ethical considerations, does it help imagining oneself being (or as) the victim? explain your view. p. 65

HW 5: Chapter two, p. 45-52

1- once you agree that a person deserve rights, can they be taken back (forfeited)? how so?

2- "... it is possible for a criminal to regain lost self-respect and the respect of others once owed him." do you agree or disagree? explain why.

3- are rights absolute? if so, how about people like charles manson or ted bundy?

4- examine the definition of coercion stated on p. 48-49. granted, we sometimes engage in coercive practies with other people. in light of kant's idea of respect, is this right? why not?

5- does self-respect involves being respected by others?

6- from the ethical standpoint what if someone willingly doesn't care for respect?

7- according to p. 51, what is the difference between prescriptions and proscriptions?

8- what is fairness? p. 52

9- explain principle #3 on p. 52. do you agree with it? (see is this way: would you not like to see the happiness of your neighborhood being increased?)

HW 4: Chapter two

this homework is from p. 40-45

1. what is areté in aristotle's philosophy?

2. can virtue (areté) be achieved without community/political interactions? explain your answer.

3. explain the idea of happiness as an ideal.

4. p. 42: find aristotle's definition for virtue. do you agree?

5. p. 43 why is the community important in achieving virtue and happiness?

6. what does it mean to respect according to kantian ethics?

7. the author proposes the following implication:

respect -----> ethical action

meaning that one cannot have meaningful ethical action without respect. do you agree? if so why?

8. once we presuppose that we have the obligation to treat others with respect can we say that people deserve respect?  

9. if so, can one conclude that persons have rights? could you come up with one right that people deserve? 

Aesthetic experience and aesthetic attitude

Aesthetic properties (APs) is what, if anything, all these AP properties have in common that leads us to classify them all as aesthetic and to distinguish them from other kinds of properties.

1- APs require taste on the part of the subject to pick them out, unlike properties like redness or rectangularity, which require only functioning eyesight. So, APs have an objective component. 

2- Aesthetic properties are to be analyzed in terms of the shared responses of competent subjects with particular tastes (this is what we call CONSENSUS). 

3- So, aesthetic properties is inter-subjective.

Aesthetic experience

Dewey/Beardsely: Aesthetic properties emerge from the object and the individual's own taste. When these experiences are shared we obtain consensus on aesthetic properties. This seems to explain stuff such as wine, paintings, etc.

Beardsley and Dewey talk of aesthetic experience as unified or coherent, and complete.

Eddy Zemach adds that we also experience negative aesthetic properties as well – ugliness, dreariness and so on – so their characterization is both too narrow and has the wrong logical priority between aesthetic experience and aesthetic properties.

Goldman: the difference between properties of experience caused by objective properties, and objective properties themselves. The movement from the dominant to the tonic chord in tonal music is typically experienced as expectation or tension, and its satisfaction or resolution. Although the tension is not literally in the tones but in our response to them, even a formal description of the work must note the tension.  

Zemach is nevertheless also correct in saying that we think of aesthetic properties as those which contribute to the positive or negative values of art works.

Aesthetic attitude

From the beginning the hallmark of the aesthetic attitude was held to be disinterest. This notion has been defined variously. We are to attend to the object as an object of contemplation only, to its phenomenal properties simply for the sake of perceiving them. We are to savor the perceptual experience for its own sake, instead of seeking to put it to further use in our practical affairs.

Jerome Stolnitz (1960) Aesthetic perception, by contrast, is once more disinterested. It aims at the enjoyment of the experience itself, grasping its object in isolation from other things,

Edward Bullough (1912) adds emotional detachment. To appreciate a tragic play properly, we must be sufficiently detached not to be tempted to interfere in the action ongoing on stage; to appreciate a storm at sea aesthetically, we must be detached from the fear that prompts precautionary action.

Triff: Not always. Lessing, following Aristotle speaks of emotional attachment as catharsis, and he believes is to be important, as if "we come to the tragic drama (unconsciously, if you will) as patients to be cured, relieved, restored to psychic health."

Zemach (1997) argues that an aesthetic interest in objects is simply one interest among other possible ones, and a self-centered interest at that, aiming at one’s own enjoyment.

Goldman's conclusion: Despite these criticisms, there are once again grains of truth in the traditional account of the aesthetic attitude. It remains the case that ordinary perception is absorbed in and functions in the service of practical action, which normally prompts attention only to aspects of objects insufficient for aesthetic appreciation of them.

HW 3: for next Tuesday pp. 8-22

1. What are ethical claims about?

2. "Unfortunately there are limits of tolerance ... and there are things that most people if not all would agree are simply wrong."  Agree? Disagree? If so, why?

3."Brutus was wrong to have killed Cesar." Provide a relativist and an objectivist reason.

4. How can we provide grounds for justification? (take a look at p. 13-15)

5. Do you agree with the author that there are critical thinking benefits in adopting objectivist judgments?

HW 2: (Chapter 1) Is it all a matter of opinion?

To properly understand chapter one, we need to have these definitions ready:

Opinion: A belief or conclusion held with confidence but not substantiated by positive knowledge or proof:

Belief: A mental state of acceptance.

Subjectivism: The truth of moral judgments is dependent upon people's beliefs.

Objectivism: The truth of moral judgments is independent of people's beliefs.

Relativism: Truth is relative to point of view (subjectivism), culture (cultural relativism).

Moral relativism: same as above, but now concerning moral judgments. So, moral judgments are not true independent of people's point of view or culture.  

Justification: something, such as facts or reasons given to hold a belief.

Knowledge: Justified true belief.

p. 13: Ethics involves non relative claims, that is, claims that are either reasonable or unreasonable.

On the other hand, ethical claims are not easy. They involve personal bias, prejudice and emotional commitments.   

HW 1: a dialogue

Let's read the assignment p. 1-7.

"dialogue" goes back to Plato's dialogues. dia = two, logue = logos (reasoning, using language)

see that the point here is to show philosophy "in action."

Rick and Nina are discussing (a "discussion" in philosophy means just a serious conversation).

Let's pay special attention to these terms. Go here and enter each term and write down these definitions in your notebook. In order to discuss, we need to be in command of the terms' definitions: 

human rights

right & wrong, and for whom?

culture, subculture

reasons and "good reasons"

"correct view" 

claims

opinion

culture-blind

What do we learn here?
Who is Nina? Who is Rick?
Whom do you agree with? Who wins the discussion? Why?

BEAUTY chapter 20

click here for my sketches on beauty,

Mothersill's causal theory of beauty

Genuine judgements of beauty presuppose aesthetic theory and aesthetic theory presupposes principles of taste (this is called redundancy). 

The causal relation between the beautiful object and the pleasure it evokes in the subject might be identifiable and illuminating without resulting in laws and hence principles of taste.

An aesthetic theory has to explain the difference between the pleasure evoked by beauty and other kinds of pleasure. 

Now, is this implying that "I like Picasso's Guernica"? is very different from "I love Zak's the Baker's baguettes?"

AW's evoke pleasure in the observer by virtue of its aesthetic properties: this is the basis of a genuine judgement of beauty.

All that is required of a subject is that there be something he takes to be beautiful and further that at least one such taking be allowed by him to be an aesthetic conviction. He can then concur in the claim that some judgements of taste are genuine judgements.

Is she saying that the strength of my belief that "Picasso's Guernica is a masterpiece" is genuine and the reason is IN Guernica's aesthetic properties?  

According to Mothersill, aesthetic properties are those qualities of objects that have no simple names and are revealed only by acquaintance. 

Disinterested pleasure 

For Aquinas (thirteenth century), the pleasure aroused by beauty is distinct from biological pleasures associated with physical desires and satisfactions.

Shaftesbury (eighteenth century) recognizes in the pleasurable response to beauty an impartiality, a lack of self-interest. He adopts the term "disinterested" from ethics to describe the pleasure recognized as associated with beauty.

Kant (1987) The pleasure of beauty according to this tradition is a pleasure caused by an object which is not accompanied by desire for the object. It should not be confused with the pleasure taken in the sensuous for its own sake; such as that which sparks that poignant sensation of our physical being in the world. Neither should it be confused with un-interest. Disinterest does not mean disengaged.

The pleasure of beauty is like perceiving a solution to a problem, and enjoying it for its own sake, rather than because personal rewards are anticipated.

The pleasure-principle tradition 

Beauty evokes a pleasurable response. If while perceiving an object you do not experience pleasure, you are not perceiving beauty.


Sircello's theory (1975), an object is beautiful when it contains a Property of Qualitative Degree to a very high degree. 

A Property of Qualitative Degree (henceforth a PQD) is a property that cannot be measured in a quantitative sense, such as can temperature or weight. Sircello further delineates a PQD by excluding those qualities that are experienced as deficiencies. 

So there is no PQD in deficiency. It seems that if a fundamental quality of the object cannot become a deficiency. Example: the sliminess of a slug and the sourness of a lemon are not deficiencies in the context of a slug’s and a lemon’s nature. As it stands, this would mean that the slug’s sliminess and the lemon’s sourness are beautiful. 

Sircello says that only those with sufficient experience of the particular quality involved can judge whether it exists in the object to a qualitatively high degree, and hence whether it is beautiful.

This would mean that according to Sircello’s theory, the sourness of the lemon is beautiful. 

Sircello speculates that the reason the experience of PQDs pleases us is because we only experience PQDs when we are seeing clearly.

Perhaps no theory of beauty can offer non-contradictory conditions. The role of an aesthetic theory is to offer plausible approximations.

Perceptual principles in beauty: are there perceptual principles in beauty?

1- Perhaps there are perceptual principles of beauty that constitute a part of the architecture of the mind of HOMO SAPIENS... as such, they are not themselves represented explicitly and unequivocally in language (could not be matched with language schemata).

2- Hence, although there are no principles of beauty as such, there would be a physical basis (a rational basis) for genuine judgements of beauty. 

3- For example, we can look at Indian sculptures, Japanese tea ceremonies and Gothic cathedrals, and while we can enjoy their perceptual beauty, we may not be able to experience their intellectual beauty in the way that someone could whose world view was saturated with the outlook exemplified in these works. 

4- So, the apprehension of intellectual beauty, from scientific to moral beauty, would demand a shared background of knowledge or a shared world view. It would be possible for an art work to arouse a response to beauty through its perceptual form without providing the phenomenologically more total beauty experience, which is a combination of relations emerging within and between its perceptual form and conceptual content. It may be that the work simply does not provide the opportunity for the latter, or it may be that the viewer does not share the same world view (metaphysical/religious) as the artist, which makes the intellectual component of the work inaccessible to the viewer.